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PUBLIC ACTORS IN PRIVATE MARKETS: 
TOWARD A DEVELOPMENTAL FINANCE STATE 
ROBERT C. HOCKETT  
SAULE T. OMAROVA 
ABSTRACT 
The recent financial crisis brought into sharp relief fundamental 
questions about the social function and purpose of the financial system, 
including its relation to the “real” economy. This Article argues that, to 
answer these questions, we must recapture a distinctively American view 
of the proper relations among state, financial market, and development. 
This programmatic vision—captured in what we call a “developmental 
finance state”—is based on three key propositions: (1) that economic and 
social development is not an “end-state” but a continuing national policy 
priority; (2) that the modalities of finance are the most potent means of 
fueling development; and (3) that the state, as the most potent financial 
actor, both must and often does pursue its developmental goals by acting 
endogenously—i.e., as a direct participant in private financial markets. In 
addition to articulating and elaborating the concept of the developmental 
finance state, this Article identifies and analyzes the principal modalities 
through which the modern American developmental finance state operates 
today. Finally, the Article proposes three broad strategic extensions of the 
existing modalities, with a view to enabling the emergence of a more 
ambitiously proactive and effective developmental finance state—and thus 
rediscovering a truly public-minded finance.  
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The spontaneous transition to new pursuits, in a community long 
habituated to different ones, may be expected to be attended with 
proportionally greater difficulty . . . . In many cases they would not 
happen . . . . To produce the desirable changes, as early as may be 
expedient, may therefore require the incitement and patronage of 
government.1 
 [A] Bank is not a mere matter of private property, but a political 
machine of the greatest importance to the State.2 
INTRODUCTION  
It is surprising that many Americans assume there to be only two, 
mutually exclusive and poetically French-named, options for defining 
governments’ relations to markets: “dirigisme” and “laissez faire.” Many 
academic and policy battles have been, and continue to be, fought on this 
uncompromisingly binary conceptual field. It is especially surprising 
because our polity never has been strictly “command-and-control” or 
“hands-off” in relation to our economy. Rather, we have always sought 
means of proactively fostering and furthering economic development and 
growth, and have done so through government instrumentalities that act in 
markets as much as they act on them. Our government is more than merely 
a market overseer and regulator—it is also a direct market participant, 
acting not only to correct market failures or to provide vital public goods 
but also to create, amplify, and guide private markets in ways that enhance 
these markets’ potential to serve important long-term public interests. 
This Article—part of a larger project—identifies, analyzes, and builds 
upon the distinctly American mode of mixing polity and economy, in 
hopes of recovering a policy approach that the nation once had and could 
use again now, after a major financial crisis.3 The tradition we seek to 
recover traces its roots directly to ideas originally formulated by the 
country’s first Treasury Secretary, Alexander Hamilton. We refer to that 
 
 
 1. Alexander Hamilton, Report on the Subject of Manufactures, in ALEXANDER HAMILTON: 
WRITINGS 647, 670–71 (Joanne B. Freeman ed., 2001) [hereinafter Report on Manufactures]. 
 2. Alexander Hamilton, Report on a National Bank, in ALEXANDER HAMILTON: WRITINGS, 
supra note 1, at 575, 599 [hereinafter Report on a National Bank]. 
 3. Of course, distinctly American does not mean uniquely American. As discussed below, in the 
nineteenth–twentieth centuries, many countries adopted this general approach to mixing polity and 
economy in pursuit of their own national goals. See infra notes 31–34 and accompanying text. Today, 
many countries continue to work on adapting it to their own needs. Here, we merely seek to remind 
our readers of the deeply American origins of this venerable policy tradition. 
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tradition under the conceptual heading of the “developmental finance 
state.” 
The developmental finance state bears three basic attributes. First, it 
treats national socio-economic development not as a particular end-state 
but as an ongoing process of conscious, forward-looking change against a 
backdrop of basic financial and macroeconomic stability. Second, it 
specifically targets financial markets and uses modalities of finance in 
pursuit of its developmental goals. Third, the developmental finance state 
operates as an integral part of private markets, deliberately bringing 
private and public actors together as partners in the ongoing national-
development project. In so doing, it defies and blurs the categorical public-
private divide so often assumed in debates on financial regulation. 
By tentatively outlining the model of our modern American 
developmental finance state, this Article makes an original contribution to 
several well-established strands in legal and social science scholarship, 
while nevertheless claiming its own distinctive intellectual territory.4 We 
examine the critically important nexus between the state, finance, and 
development from a unique perspective.5 Rather than drawing broad 
institutional comparisons on a grand state-market-society canvas, we focus 
on the specific modalities of state action within, rather than upon, financial 
markets. In this vein, we start defining the concept of a developmental 
 
 
 4. Our project builds upon, and speaks to, a multidisciplinary set of literatures, including legal 
scholarship on various aspects of finance and financial services regulation, multiple literatures on 
public-private relations and dynamics, and social science research on institutional political economy, 
industrial policy, and the developmental state. For a sample of relevant recent social science research, 
see Karl Aiginger & Susanne Sieber, The Matrix Approach to Industrial Policy, 20 INT’L REV. 
APPLIED ECON. 573 (2006); Ben Clift & Cornelia Woll, Economic Patriotism: Reinventing Control 
over Open Markets, 19 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 307 (2012); Robert H. Wade, Return of Industrial Policy?, 
26 INT’L REV. APPLIED ECON. 223 (2012). For classic expositions of the developmental state model, 
see ALICE H. AMSDEN, ASIA’S NEXT GIANT: SOUTH KOREA AND LATE INDUSTRIALIZATION (1989); 
PETER EVANS, EMBEDDED AUTONOMY: STATES AND INDUSTRIAL TRANSFORMATION (1995); 
CHALMERS JOHNSON, JAPAN: WHO GOVERNS?: THE RISE OF THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE (1995); 
ROBERT WADE, GOVERNING THE MARKET: ECONOMIC THEORY AND THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN 
EAST ASIAN INDUSTRIALIZATION (1990). For an overview of development theory and the current state 
of the developmental state scholarship, see Peter Evans, The Developmental State: Divergent 
Responses to Modern Economic Theory and the Twenty-First-Century Economy, in THE END OF THE 
DEVELOPMENTAL STATE? 220 (Michelle Williams ed., 2014).  
 5. Generally, much of the scholarly analysis of developmental policies in modern Europe and 
East Asia focused on the fundamental structure of individual countries’ national finance. See, e.g., 
Chalmers Johnson, Political Institutions and Economic Performance: The Government-Business 
Relationship in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE NEW ASIAN 
INDUSTRIALISM 136 (Frederic C. Deyo ed., 1987); JUNG-EN WOO, RACE TO THE SWIFT: STATE AND 
FINANCE IN KOREAN INDUSTRIALIZATION (1991); JOHN ZYSMAN, GOVERNMENTS, MARKETS, AND 
GROWTH: FINANCIAL SYSTEMS AND THE POLITICS OF INDUSTRIAL CHANGE (1983). 
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finance state inductively, through description and analysis of its currently 
existing modalities.  
We argue that the government is an important endogenous actor in 
today’s financial markets and construct a provisional taxonomy of the 
roles the government plays in that capacity. We define these roles as 
market-making, market-moving, market-levering, and market-preserving.6 
The primary goal of our taxonomy-building exercise is to elucidate the 
hidden or under-appreciated threads of common meaning behind 
seemingly unrelated, and often all too familiar, phenomena. In effect, we 
reveal the face of the modern American developmental finance state. 
Importantly, our taxonomy provides a conceptual apparatus and 
operational vocabulary indispensable for a systematic recognition and 
examination of public instrumentalities’ existing market-actor practices 
across a wide range of issues.7 
We further argue that a functional taxonomy of present government-as-
market-actor roles has potentially significant forward-looking public 
policy implications. It provides a conceptual framework for envisioning 
expansions of identified modalities beyond their current forms. To this 
end, we engage in an explicitly normative, prescriptive undertaking that 
aims to test both the public-policy relevance of our analysis and the 
conceptual reach of our provisional model of a developmental finance 
state. We argue that the normative justification for the government’s 
action in private markets should go well beyond the traditional market-
failure and public-goods arguments. Instead of acting only to correct some 
specific market failure or to supply some traditional public good, 
government instrumentalities should use their unique ability to harness the 
power of private financial markets for the purpose of promoting long-term 
national development and ensuring financial and macroeconomic stability. 
We advance several proposals for expanding the scope and intensity of 
the government’s financial market-actor functions, in pursuit of a more 
coherent, comprehensive, and normatively emboldened agenda. In 
particular, we propose adopting a broad asset-price stability maintenance 
 
 
 6. See infra Parts I.B.2, II. 
 7. In this respect, our argument complements and contributes to a broader emerging trend in 
social science research that explicitly recognizes and examines the central role of the state in creating 
markets for technological innovation and shaping knowledge-based growth. See generally MARIANA 
MAZZUCATO, THE ENTREPRENEURIAL STATE: DEBUNKING PUBLIC VS. PRIVATE SECTOR MYTHS 
(2014) (examining the entrepreneurial role of the state in knowledge-intensive industries); Fred Block, 
Swimming Against the Current: The Rise of a Hidden Developmental State in the United States, 36 
POL. & SOC’Y 169 (2008) (analyzing the critical role of the US government’s developmental intiatives 
in supporting scientific and technological advances). 
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program, establishing a public-private national investment and 
infrastructure-financing vehicle, and creating a special “golden share” 
regime for financial firms’ internal governance.8 In many ways, our 
proposals are unorthodox and ambitious thought experiments. We paint a 
broad picture, which inevitably glosses over a number of important issues 
related to institutional design, procedural framework, and broader 
political-economic substance of the proposed arrangements—issues we are 
planning to address in future work. The goal of this Article is not to offer a 
ready-to-use legislative blueprint but to push our collective imagination 
beyond the constraints of current discourse, to show how this new 
perspective on the role of public actors in private financial markets opens 
up new policy terrain, rich with possibility. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I examines the historical origins 
of what we are calling the developmental finance state model and 
elaborates the key parameters of that concept. Part II constructs a basic 
taxonomy of market-actor roles that federal government instrumentalities 
have been playing since at least the New Deal era. Part III advances three 
separate sets of policy proposals aimed at extending the federal 
government’s market-actor functions beyond their current forms, in order 
to enable the emergence of a more coherent and effective developmental 
finance state. The Conclusion offers brief closing remarks and looks 
forward to next steps in this project.  
I. STATE, FINANCE, AND DEVELOPMENT: REDISCOVERING THE LINK 
A. American Origins of the Developmental Finance State: The Forgotten 
Heritage 
Contrary to today’s dominant narrative, the concept of a strong 
centralized government actively pursuing a coherent national 
developmental strategy is very much an American idea. The first US 
Secretary of the Treasury, Alexander Hamilton, was the first modern 
statesman to put forward a comprehensive plan of state-led economic 
development as the basis for attaining and maintaining true national 
independence and prosperity.9 In sharp contrast to Thomas Jefferson’s 
 
 
 8. See infra Part III. 
 9. For detailed accounts of Alexander Hamilton’s life and ideas, see generally RON CHERNOW, 
ALEXANDER HAMILTON (2004); STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 
(1993); FORREST MCDONALD, ALEXANDER HAMILTON: A BIOGRAPHY (1979); BROADUS MITCHELL, 
ALEXANDER HAMILTON: A CONCISE BIOGRAPHY (1976); see also THOMAS K. MCCRAW, THE 
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ideal of America as an agrarian economy financed by small local banks 
and minimally overseen by small local government, Alexander Hamilton 
saw the young American nation’s power in the future as riding on 
technical and financial prowess.10 To Hamilton, a politically and 
economically independent American Republic required an “energetic”—
not “imbecilic”—government, a well-developed system of finance, and a 
well-diversified productive capacity.11 By fully articulating the intimate 
connection among these three elements, Hamilton effectively envisaged 
the United States as the first developmental state—with the emerging 
qualities of a developmental finance state.12 
At the heart of Hamilton’s development strategy was the creation of a 
strong public-private system of finance that would, on the one hand, 
underwrite federal monetary control and credit expansion and, on the other 
hand, aggregate and channel vital resources toward building American 
industry and trade. Hamilton proceeded with this program in a series of 
steps that fundamentally shaped the modern American economy. Pursuant 
to his program, the new national government assumed all of the separate 
States’ revolutionary war debts and securitized them by issuing US 
Treasury instruments. To manage the emerging system of reliable national 
money and credit, Hamilton designed and pushed for establishing the first 
Bank of the United States (the “Bank”)—in effect, the nation’s first central 
bank.13  
 
 
FOUNDERS AND FINANCE: HOW HAMILTON, GALLATIN, AND OTHER IMMIGRANTS FORGED A NEW 
ECONOMY (2012). 
 10. See sources cited supra note 9; see also Alexander Hamilton, Report on Public Credit, in 
ALEXANDER HAMILTON: WRITINGS, supra note 1, at 531; Report on Manufactures, supra note 1; 
Report on a National Bank, supra note 2. For more on Jefferson’s contrasting vision, see ELKINS & 
MCKITRICK, supra note 9, at 195–208; see also LANCE BANNING, THE JEFFERSONIAN PERSUASION: 
EVOLUTION OF A PARTY IDEOLOGY (1978); DREW R. MCCOY, THE ELUSIVE REPUBLIC: POLITICAL 
ECONOMY IN JEFFERSONIAN AMERICA (1980). 
 11. See CHERNOW, supra note 9, at 1–6, 344–79; ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 9, at 92–
132, 258–62; MCDONALD, supra note 9, at 117–210. 
 12. It is worth noting that there have been competing interpretations of Hamilton’s historical 
legacy ever since the time of Hamilton himself. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 9. Some 
progressives and “states’ rights” enthusiasts from Jefferson and Madison on down have demonized 
him as a champion of moneyed interests or of autocratic government, while other progressives and 
activist Republicans from Abraham Lincoln to Theodore Roosevelt have lionized him as a visionary 
champion of federally-orchestrated beneficial change. See, e.g., Christian Parenti, Reading Hamilton 
from the Left, JACOBIN (Aug. 26, 2014), https://www.jacobinmag.com/2014/08/reading-hamilton-
from-the-left/ (discussing various ideological interpretations of Hamilton’s legacy). We do not purport 
to resolve this century-old dispute here. Our point is simply to emphasize that the idea of using the 
state as a tool to promote nation-wide economic change is as old and as American as the original 
architecture of our federal government and financial system themselves. Thanks to Aziz Rana for 
pressing us on this point. 
 13. See generally Report on a National Bank, supra note 2. 
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Two aspects of Hamilton’s model of the Bank are particularly relevant 
for our purposes. First, it was explicitly designed as a public-private joint 
venture that “unite[d] public authority and faith with private credit.”14 The 
Bank was initially capitalized at $10 million—an enormous sum at the 
time—with subscriptions supplied by private parties and the federal 
government.15 Although the government contributed 20% of the Bank’s 
capital and accordingly held a minority equity stake,16 it played an active 
role as the insider-guardian of the public interest.17 Second, the Bank 
functioned in part as a national development bank. In this capacity, it 
made targeted investments in various development projects, primarily 
infrastructural in character.18 Hamilton thought private investors more 
likely to make wise, economically sensible investment choices and, 
accordingly, arranged for “private” directors on the Bank’s board to take 
the lead role in its investment decision-making.19 The Bank’s “public” 
directors, however, played a continuing oversight role even with respect to 
these decisions, and, crucially, were to withdraw the federal subscription 
from the Bank in the event that the private directors sought to make crony 
or otherwise profligate-looking project investments over the public 
directors’ objections.20 This further underscored the federal government’s 
unique role as a “joint proprietor in th[e] undertaking.”21 
 
 
 14. Alexander Hamilton, To James Duane, in ALEXANDER HAMILTON: WRITINGS, supra note 1, 
at 70, 83 [hereinafter Letter to James Duane]; see also Report on a National Bank, supra note 2, at 585 
(emphasis added) (“[B]anks . . . enable honest and industrious men, of small or perhaps of no capital[,] 
to undertake and prosecute business, with advantage to themselves and to the community . . . .”). 
 15. See Report on a National Bank, supra note 2, at 604. The $10-million initial capitalization 
was several times the combined capital of all then-existing US banks. See CHERNOW, supra note 9, at 
349. 
 16. See Report on a National Bank, supra note 2, at 608.  
 17. Hamilton explained these provisions through explicit reference to the fundamental public 
interest in ensuring the properly prudent operation of the Bank: 
If the paper of a Bank is to be permitted to insinuate itself into all the revenues and receipts of 
a country; if it is even to be tolerated as the substitute for gold and silver, in all the 
transactions of business, it becomes in either view a national concern of the first magnitude. 
Report on a National Bank, supra note 2, at 603. 
 18. Hamilton was keenly aware of the critical role infrastructure played in a nation’s economy—
even when the latter was considered already well “developed.” See Report on Manufactures, supra 
note 1, at 707 (“There is perhaps scarcely any thing, which has been better calculated to assist the 
manufactures of Great Britain, than the ameliorations of the public roads of that Kingdom, and the 
great progress which has been of late made in opening canals. Of the former, the United States stand 
much in need; and for the latter they present uncommon facilities.”). 
 19. See Report on a National Bank, supra note 2, at 602; see also Letter to James Duane, supra 
note 14, at 83 (“Paper credit never was long supported in any country, on a national scale, where it was 
not founded on the joint basis of public and private credit.”). 
  20. See, e.g., MCDONALD, supra note 9, at 189–210. In this sense, the Bank operated somewhat 
like a private equity fund whose “passive” partners in effect had a veto power because they were not 
required to “lock up” funds for set periods of time. Aspects of this arrangement will figure in our 
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The final element of Hamilton’s program—in addition to the creation 
of a reliable national system of money and credit and the establishment of 
a central bank—directly concerned state-promoted industrialization of the 
United States. To this end, Hamilton planned yet another public-private 
partnership of sorts, organized as a combined “development corporation” 
and “enterprise zone.”22 This partnership took the form of an indirectly 
federally-funded, New Jersey-chartered corporation named the Society for 
Establishing Useful Manufactures (“S.U.M.”).23 The corporation was to be 
initially capitalized through private subscriptions (with US Treasury 
securities as paid-in capital); and its location between New York City and 
Philadelphia gave it access both to abundant cheap water power and to 
investors in the two largest financial centers of the day.24 The 
corporation’s aim was to develop efficient means of manufacturing 
various finished goods and to demonstrate the practicability and ready 
imitability of such means to the nation at large.25 To Hamilton, this was a 
project of actively creating what we now know as a Ricardian comparative 
advantage, so as to render the nation not only juridically but also 
practically sovereign and self-sufficient.26  
Hamilton’s manufacturing plan was not fully completed in his lifetime. 
Nevertheless, his ideas fundamentally determined America’s entire 
developmental trajectory. Remarkably, Thomas Jefferson, Hamilton’s 
chief antagonist while in office, pursued explicitly Hamiltonian policies 
during his own presidential administration.27 In the early to mid-nineteenth 
century, Henry Clay and John C. Calhoun’s “American System” was 
 
 
proposals below. For more on the operations of modern private equity firms and their significance to 
our project, see infra Part III.B. 
 21. Alexander Hamilton, Opinion on the Constitutionality of a National Bank, in ALEXANDER 
HAMILTON: WRITINGS, supra note 1, at 613, 632; see also id. at 646 (noting that the government 
would remain a “proprietor” and would “share in the profit, or loss, of the institution”). 
 22. See CHERNOW, supra note 9 at 370–79; ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 9, at 258–62; 
MCCRAW, supra note 9, at 122–36; MCDONALD, supra note 9, at 189–210. 
 23. See sources cited supra note 22. 
 24. See sources cited supra note 22. The town of Paterson that grew around it can be compared 
to a modern-day technology cluster zone like Silicon Valley. 
 25. See Report on Manufactures, supra note 1. 
 26. See sources cited supra note 22. 
 27. Jefferson pursued these policies through his own Treasury Secretary—Albert Gallatin—who 
began as a Hamilton antagonist in Congress, and ended up being arguably more Hamiltonian than even 
Hamilton. See MCCRAW, supra note 9, at 179–328; RAYMOND WALTERS, JR., ALBERT GALLATIN: 
JEFFERSONIAN FINANCIER AND DIPLOMAT 170–84 (1957); Carter Goodrich, The Gallatin Plan After 
One Hundred and Fifty Years, 102 PROC. AM. PHIL. SOC’Y 436, 436–41 (1958). See generally CARTER 
GOODRICH, GOVERNMENT PROMOTION OF AMERICAN CANALS AND RAILROADS 1800–1890 (1960) 
(describing various political and ideological factors that shaped early US economic policies). 
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Hamiltonian in inspiration and design.28 Later, Henry Carey, President 
Lincoln’s chief economic advisor, also explicitly embraced the 
Hamiltonian mantle.29 Finally, much of the most innovative governmental 
development activity during the Progressive era, Roosevelt’s New Deal, 
and the post-war Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations, which 
bequeathed many of the institutions that we discuss below, took a 
straightforwardly Hamiltonian market-actor form.30  
Furthermore, Hamilton’s vision of a proactive, modernizing state 
deliberately altering the nation’s “natural” comparative advantage was the 
original inspiration behind the best-known European and Asian economic 
“miracles.”31 Friedrich List, the chief architect of Germany’s rapid 
industrialization, built his program on Hamiltonian principles.32 In the late 
nineteenth century, List’s, and hence Hamilton’s, programs were explicitly 
adopted in Meiji Japan.33 From there, Hamiltonian ideas spread to South 
Korea, Taiwan, and other late twentieth-century East Asian “tiger” 
economies that often are equated with the very concept of a modern 
developmental state.34 
 
 
 28. See generally GOODRICH, supra note 27; Michael J. Lacey, Federalism and National 
Planning: The Nineteenth-Century Legacy, in THE AMERICAN PLANNING TRADITION: CULTURE AND 
POLICY 89 (Robert Fishman ed., 2000); JOHN LAURITZ LARSON, INTERNAL IMPROVEMENT: NATIONAL 
PUBLIC WORKS AND THE PROMISE OF POPULAR GOVERNMENT IN THE EARLY UNITED STATES (2001); 
MICHAEL LIND, HAMILTON’S REPUBLIC: READINGS IN THE AMERICAN DEMOCRATIC NATIONALIST 
TRADITION (1997); CHARLES SELLERS, THE MARKET REVOLUTION: JACKSONIAN AMERICA, 1815–
1846 (1991).  
 29. For an exposition of Carey’s Hamiltonian views, see HENRY C. CAREY, THE HARMONY OF 
INTERESTS: AGRICULTURAL, MANUFACTURING & COMMERCIAL (Augustus M. Kelley 1967) (1851) 
(advocating the “American System” of developmental capitalism, in which government fosters 
domestic industry and national self-sufficiency, in contrast to the “British System” of laissez faire 
capitalism and free trade). See also PAUL K. CONKIN, PROPHETS OF PROSPERITY: AMERICA’S FIRST 
POLITICAL ECONOMISTS (1980) (devoting last two chapters of the book to discussion of Carey’s 
views). 
 30. For more on these later programs and their Hamiltonian forms, see Robert Hockett, A 
Jeffersonian Republic by Hamiltonian Means: Values, Constraints, and Finance in the Design of A 
Comprehensive and Contemporary American “Ownership Society,” 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 45, 99–124 
(2005) [hereinafter A Jeffersonian Republic]. 
 31. See generally HA-JOON CHANG, KICKING AWAY THE LADDER: DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY IN 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (2002); IAN PATRICK AUSTIN, COMMON FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN AND 
EAST ASIAN MODERNISATION: FROM ALEXANDER HAMILTON TO JUNICHERO KOIZUMI (2009). See 
also LIND, supra note 28, at 330–35. 
 32. List’s “National System” was even named in tandem with Clay’s and Calhoun’s “American 
System.” See generally CHANG, supra note 31; FRIEDRICH LIST, THE NATIONAL SYSTEM OF 
POLITICAL ECONOMY (Sampson S. Lloyd trans., Augustus M. Kelley 1966) (1885); William Notz, 
Frederick List in America, 16 AM. ECON. REV. 249 (1926). See also AUSTIN, supra note 31, at 75–
106; LIND, supra note 28, at 330–35. 
 33. See, e.g., AUSTIN, supra note 31, at 261–318. See also LIND, supra note 28, at 330–35; PAUL 
LINEBARGER ET AL., FAR EASTERN GOVERNMENTS AND POLITICS: CHINA AND JAPAN 326 (1954). 
 34. See AUSTIN, supra note 31, at 261–318; LINEBARGER ET AL., supra note 33, at 326; see also 
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Tracing the lineage of the developmental state to Alexander Hamilton 
reveals the deep irony behind America’s present self-image as a 
genetically-encoded laissez-faire state. The rise of neoliberal economics 
and free-market fundamentalism as the dominant American ideology 
supplied a skewed historical and political narrative that deliberately 
ignores Hamilton’s influence and the decisive role of the state in this 
country’s industrial development. This narrative presents the American 
economic model “as a page out of a neoclassical economics textbook,” an 
unquestioned triumph of self-interested individuals acting rationally and 
autonomously in self-adjusting markets.35 On this textbook page, the 
government is generally portrayed as an external, extra-economic force 
that imposes politically-derived—thus, presumptively “unnatural” and 
potentially inefficient—constraints on the market. The government is 
inherently incapable of entrepreneurship and innovation and, therefore, 
should stay out of the way of private market actors who alone can generate 
economic prosperity and human progress.36 In short, the neoliberal 
doctrine draws a stark dividing line: governments act in the public, 
political sphere, while markets constitute the private, economic sphere.  
Even in this elegantly sterile neoliberal narrative, however, the divide 
is not absolute, and the government is generally recognized as playing two 
market-supporting roles. First, governments intervene in the markets 
“from above” by imposing various legal and regulatory constraints on 
private parties’ behavior to ensure order and civility, to prevent or limit 
socially undesirable outcomes, or to set standards for socially desirable 
ones. We call this a supervisory function.37 Second, governments help to 
constitute markets “from below,” by supplying some of the basic rules of 
the game—such as property and contract laws—necessary to enable 
frictionless operation of private markets. We call this a constitutive 
function.38 Two theoretical justifications are typically used to 
accommodate these two forms of government interference in private 
 
 
LIND, supra note 28, at 330–35; David Levi-Faur, Friedrich List and the Political Economy of the 
Nation-State, 4 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 154 (1997).  
 35. Jonah D. Levy, Robert A. Kagan & John Zysman, The Twin Restorations: The Political 
Economy of the Reagan and Thatcher “Revolutions,” in TEN PARADIGMS OF MARKET ECONOMIES 
AND LAND SYSTEMS 4 (Lee-Jay Cho & Yoon Hyung Kim eds., 1998). 
 36. President Ronald Reagan’s famous quote sums up the basic sentiment behind this worldview: 
“[G]overnment is not the solution to our problem; government is the problem.” Ronald W. Reagan, 
President of the United States, Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 1981), available at http://www.reagan 
foundation.org/pdf/Inaugural_Address_012081.pdf.  
 37. Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, “Private” Means to “Public” Ends: Governments 
as Market Actors, 15 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 53, 55 (2014). 
 38. Id. 
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markets: correcting specific market failures and providing specific public 
goods.39  
We argue that this dominant view of public-private, government-
market dynamics is both descriptively incomplete and normatively weak. 
Descriptively, it overlooks a critically important third modality of 
government action in the private economic sphere—that of an endogenous 
market participant alongside its private partners and counterparties. 
Normatively, it is incapable of offering a programmatic vision for utilizing 
the government’s unique strengths to unlock private markets’ heretofore 
unrecognized potential to generate greater public benefits.40 
Along both of these dimensions, the dominant narrative is also 
inconsistent with the fundamentally American tradition of a strong 
developmental state financed through a mix of public and private means, 
which goes back to Secretary Hamilton’s program.41 By contrast, we see 
our project as an attempt to reclaim and revive this part of the American 
national heritage. In keeping with Hamilton’s original vision, our primary 
focus is on the crucial interaction between an energetic government, 
public-private finance, and continuous national development.  
Of course, the dynamics of this interaction in the 21st century will be 
different from what they were in 1790. In the context of today’s more 
complex financial system, the mechanisms through which the state asserts 
its market presence and exercises its market leadership will themselves be 
more complex. In this Article, we aim to elucidate some of these public-
private dynamics and to identify some of these state-market interaction 
mechanisms, both as they currently operate and as they might be made to 
operate in the future. This effort is not as grand or as imbued with 
historical significance as was Hamilton’s nation-building project, but it 
derives its inspiration from the same “moral ambition.”42   
 
 
 39. For a more detailed discussion of these phenomena, see infra Part II. 
 40. As Mariana Mazzucato argues in connection with the entrepreneurial leadership of the state 
in technological innovation: 
Providing such leadership, the State makes things happen that otherwise would not have. But 
whether this role is justified given the characteristics of ‘public good’ and the role of 
‘externalities’ (both critical to the market failure argument), or whether it is justified due to a 
broader understanding of the State as a courageous actor in the economic system makes all 
the difference. . . . Rather than analysing the State’s active role through its correction of 
‘market failures’ (emphasized by many ‘progressive’ economists who rightly see many 
failures), it is necessary to build a theory of the State’s role in shaping and creating markets 
. . . . 
MAZZUCATO, supra note 7, at 7–8. 
 41.  See supra notes 13–26 and accompanying text. 
 42. Michael Loriaux, The French Developmental State As Myth and Moral Ambition, in THE 
DEVELOPMENTAL STATE 235, 237 (Meredith Woo-Cumings ed., 1999) (arguing that development is 
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B. The Developmental Finance State: Outlines of the Concept 
1. Working Definition: Framing the Inquiry 
Three propositions form the basis of our argument. First of all, we 
assert the utmost significance of pursuing socio-economic development as 
a continuous national project that does not end once a country is 
sufficiently industrialized and modernized to be considered a “developed” 
economy. Development is not a particular end-of-history state; it is an 
inherently dynamic phenomenon. Development is a conscious pursuit of 
qualitative (not merely quantitative) growth and adaptation to new 
environments; it is an evolutionary process of national self-definition and 
reinvention. In today’s world, any “developed” nation that does not strive 
to develop risks losing its global competitive edge. In this sense, the 
United States is a developing country, whether or not Americans realize or 
admit it. We seek to re-introduce this critically important normative 
concept into the public discourse. 
Secondly, we view this conscious pursuit of national development as a 
fundamentally public-private enterprise. As the ultimate public, collective 
actor, the federal government is well-positioned to formulate a national 
developmental strategy. But its successful implementation would require 
the government to utilize, deliberately and systematically, its ability to 
participate directly in private market transactions as an endogenous, rather 
than merely exogenous, actor. Via this explicitly participatory market-
actor modality, the government can lead the market from within—thus 
becoming an integral part of the private market, altering some of the 
market’s potentially undesirable internal dynamics, and empowering both 
the market and the nation. 
Finally, we deliberately focus on the use of financial techniques and 
financial instruments as primary methods of the government’s pursuit of 
developmental goals in its role as a market actor. Finance represents both 
the lifeblood of the economy and “the nerves of the state”—it is the 
principal link connecting the state and the market.43 Finance is a universal 
productive input; it can be easily moved and re-deployed for a multitude 
of purposes.44 Moreover, the increasing financialization of the American 
 
 
fundamentally a nation’s “moral ambition” and an aspiration to develop rather than a specific set of 
policies). 
 43. Meredith Woo-Cumings, Introduction: Chalmers Johnson and the Politics of Nationalism 
and Development, in THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE, supra note 42, at 10 (quoting Jean Bodin). 
 44. See ZYSMAN, supra note 5, at 76–77 (discussing the “universality” of finance as a policy 
tool). 
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economy in recent decades makes finance a particularly potent lever of 
economic and political power. Therefore, we view financial markets as the 
strategic arena in which America’s future developmental trajectory will be 
decided.  
These three elements, inspired by and building upon Hamiltonian 
ideas, define the contours of what we tentatively call here a developmental 
finance state model. A “developmental finance state” can be defined as a 
state that pursues specific developmental goals through direct participation 
in private financial markets as an endogenous market actor.  
Far from being a fully theorized construct, this working definition is 
merely a starting point in our inquiry into the nature of this complex 
phenomenon. Two basic questions frame this inquiry: What does this 
model look like in reality? And what could it look like if we had a better 
understanding of its transformative potential?  
2. Descriptive Aspect: Developing a Taxonomy 
Our focus is on government instrumentalities—public actors—that 
engage in typical forms of financial transactions in private markets as 
buyers, sellers, lenders, borrowers, and insurers. Yet, because they are 
public instrumentalities, their seemingly ordinary commercial activities 
can, and often do, have uniquely profound effects on the markets in which 
they operate. First of all, the government is a very big actor, potentially 
able to command enormous financial resources on the strength of its full 
faith and credit. Its size and significant funding advantages allow the 
government to affect the market much more forcefully than any individual 
private actor. Secondly, even as a market actor, the government is not 
driven—and thus constrained—by purely pecuniary motives. Government 
instrumentalities typically participate in private markets to achieve some 
public goal; they are not motivated by a single-minded pursuit of private 
gain. This fundamental difference enables public entities to counteract 
certain cumulatively irrational effects of private parties’ individually 
rational short-term profit-seeking actions. In that sense, government 
instrumentalities are uniquely well-positioned to perform the critically 
important role of market contrarians. Finally, the government can use its 
regulatory powers to support and facilitate the fulfillment of its market 
objectives.45  
 
 
 45. Adam Levitin and Susan Wachter provide a thoughtful case study of direct government 
participation in the US housing finance market as a regulatory modality, which they call “public 
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This political side of the government, however, is also the perennial 
source of suspicion that accompanies state participation in economic 
activity. The main reasons for concern are well-known: we fear that the 
state will abuse its power to coerce; we worry that state bureaucrats may 
lack the expertise to carry out their proclaimed goals; we doubt that they 
are able to resist political pressure or the corrupting influence of money. 
These concerns are legitimate, but they tend to obscure the positive, 
constructive potential of the government’s role as a market-actor.46  
To elucidate this under-appreciated transformative potential, we 
develop a provisional taxonomy of the functions currently performed by 
various government instrumentalities directly participating in private 
financial markets. We identify and discuss four categories of such 
functions: market-making, market-moving, market-levering, and market-
preserving.47 Together, these four aspects of the government-as-market-
actor modality can be viewed as constituting the current prototype of the 
modern American developmental finance state.  
The “market-making” category encompasses those instances in which a 
government instrumentality assumes risks that private actors usually are 
unable or unwilling to bear and, by doing so, either establishes or directly 
and substantially facilitates the emergence of a particular publicly 
beneficial market. In this role, public actors actively create the space for 
previously non-existent, or only incipient, private exchange.  
The “market-moving” category refers to instances in which 
government action affects certain market prices to produce public benefits 
that profit-driven private parties ordinarily are not motivated to produce. 
In this role, public actors guide private markets by altering price signals in 
a manner that counteracts such markets’ tendency to under-supply publicly 
beneficial outcomes.  
The “market-levering” category includes various forms of government 
action expanding, amplifying, or optimizing the functioning of existing 
 
 
option” regulation. See Adam J. Levitin & Susan M. Wachter, The Public Option in Housing Finance, 
46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1111 (2013) [hereinafter Public Option]. 
 46. In large part due to the dominance of neoliberal, market-fundamentalist ideology in US 
policy discourse in recent decades, the existing popular and academic literature criticizing the 
government for everything it does or does not do is simply too voluminous to cite here. For a recent 
example of a sweepingly critical take on government action, see PETER H. SCHUCK, WHY 
GOVERNMENT FAILS SO OFTEN: AND HOW IT CAN DO BETTER (2014). Our goal in this Article is not 
to refute these well-worn criticisms but to highlight what they either ignore or significantly understate: 
the fact that the government, despite its internally fragmented structure and complex dynamics, 
remains the most powerful tool of pursuing public interests in private markets. 
 47. See infra Part II. 
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private markets. In this role, public actors magnify private markets and 
boost their potential to produce public benefits.  
Finally, the “market-preserving” category denotes a range of 
government actions—typically temporary and undertaken only in 
emergency situations—that prevent the collapse of a previously self-
sustaining private market. In this role, public actors act as the ultimate 
market contrarians: they save a private market by halting its inherent self-
destructive dynamics, in order to avoid a greater public harm.  
The definitional boundaries within our proposed taxonomy of public 
roles in private markets are inherently fluid. The four categories we 
identify are not mutually exclusive, nor are they hard and fast. Any one of 
these roles can be, and often is, employed as a means of discharging the 
functions of one or more of the others in particular circumstances. In 
practice, it may be impossible to find a pure form of a particular 
government-as-market-actor role, as presented in our taxonomy. 
Nevertheless, categorizing and distinguishing these functions is a helpful 
analytical and expository tool that, on the one hand, helps to sharpen and 
enrich our understanding of the underlying logic and significance of past 
and present actions by government actors in private markets and, on the 
other hand, enables us to envisage future uses of public actors’ market 
power for public ends. This taxonomy of functions, however fluid and 
intertwined, provides a vocabulary for a bolder and more pro-active 
approach to policy-making.48  
Our provisional taxonomy of government roles in private markets is by 
no means exhaustive or all-encompassing, either theoretically or 
descriptively.49 There are many ways in which public actors—government 
bureaucracies and quasi-government entities—intervene or participate in 
private market exchanges. For example, governments routinely act as 
buyers, sellers, lenders, and borrowers in numerous market transactions. In 
terms of what any particular government actor does in each such “normal” 
market exchange (e.g., buying or selling services or goods), its actions 
 
 
 48. See MAZZUCATO, supra note 7, at 8 (“[W]e must start using new words to describe the 
State.”).  
 49. For example, sociologist Fred Block has developed a taxonomy of governmental roles in the 
markets for new technologies. According to Block, the US federal government directly shapes 
developmental outcomes in the high-tech sector by performing four overlapping functions: targeted 
resourcing, opening windows, business and technological brokering, and facilitating. Block, supra 
note 7, at 172–74. In each role, the government works directly and proactively with private firms and 
scientists to identify, fund, and nurture potentially promising technological innovations that private 
investors consider too risky. While reflecting the distinctive dynamics of the knowledge-based high-
tech sector, Block’s notion of a “developmental network state” is parallel to, and shares many 
fundamental similarities with, our concept of a developmental finance state. Id. (emphasis added).  
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may appear indistinguishable from those we label as forms of market-
making or market-moving. Yet, for purposes of our discussion, it is 
important to draw a conceptual boundary between instances in which the 
government acts primarily in its capacity as a consumer or provider of 
specific services or goods, on the one hand, and instances in which the 
same government’s primary intent in entering into a market transaction is 
to make, move, lever, or preserve the target market, on the other hand.  
That is why our taxonomy of market-actor roles generally excludes 
such ubiquitous phenomena as government procurement and public 
utilities. Undoubtedly, the government may be the sole or the largest 
consumer of particular goods or services (e.g., in the market for military 
airplanes or submarines manufactured by private firms) who effectively 
creates and moves prices in the market. Yet, typically, any such market 
effect is merely collateral, an unpremeditated result rather than the primary 
purpose of the action intended to satisfy a particular need of the 
government qua government (e.g., as the monopoly provider of national 
military defense). Only where the relevant government actor consciously 
uses these second-order market effects to influence behavior of private 
counterparties outside the context of the primary transaction does it 
potentially assume an explicit market-actor role within the meaning of our 
taxonomy.50  
Similarly, the mere fact of public ownership of an economic enterprise 
does not automatically render the government a market-actor within the 
meaning of our argument. Thus, public utilities may compete with private 
providers and, in that sense, act as “normal” market participants. Yet, their 
primary purpose may not extend as far as market-moving or market-
levering, nor may they necessarily be able to exert sufficient market power 
to move the entire market in a particular way. Only to the extent public 
enterprise is deliberately used as a vehicle for causing an endogenous 
public-benefitting change in private markets can it be said to play a 
market-actor role.  
The principal purpose of our taxonomy-building exercise is to uncover 
the face of the American developmental finance state, as it currently 
exists. It routinely performs various market-actor roles that are 
 
 
 50. One well-known example of this type of government action was the decision of the US Navy 
to switch from coal to oil as the source of fuel for its military ships in the early twentieth century. In 
that case, government procurement fundamentally changed, in a specifically intended manner, not only 
the market for military fuel but also the broader US energy market. See Richard Rhodes, How Oil 
Became King, HISTORY TODAY, Aug. 2012, available at http://www.historytoday.com/richard-
rhodes/how-oil-became-king; Petroleum and Sea Power, AM. OIL & GAS HISTORICAL SOC’Y, 
http://aoghs.org/petroleum-in-war/petroleum-and-sea-power/ (last visited June 28, 2015). 
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simultaneously extremely familiar and fundamentally under-appreciated, 
in large part because of the lack of an effective conceptual apparatus for 
explaining their overall significance. In that sense, the modern American 
developmental finance state is “hidden” in plain sight.51 Our taxonomy 
seeks to remedy this handicap.  
3. Prescriptive Aspect: Testing the Outer Limits 
Perhaps more importantly, our taxonomy of government-as-market-
actor roles provides a conceptual framework for envisioning potential 
extensions of the identified modalities beyond their current forms. Inspired 
by the Hamiltonian vision, we advocate for a normatively emboldened and 
operationally expanded exercise of the government’s power as a market 
actor. We argue that the normative justification for the government’s 
action in private markets should go well beyond the traditional market-
failure and public-goods arguments. Instead of acting only to correct 
specific instances of market failure (including the under-provision of 
traditional public goods), government instrumentalities should make a 
more strategic use of their unique ability to harness, from within, the 
power of private markets for the purpose of shaping and promoting the 
long-term development of the national economy.52 
Historical experience shows, however, that defining substantive goals 
and criteria of national development is an inherently complex, context-
specific, and deeply contested process.53 In our public discourse, economic 
issues are generally not framed in terms of development or developmental 
policy, as if these concerns should be reserved only for the less developed, 
economically “backward” countries.54 In the current US climate of 
extreme political and economic polarization, moreover, any attempt to 
 
 
 51. We borrow this term from Fred Block. See Block, supra note 7, at 170. 
 52. Writing about the government’s central role in promoting scientific research and 
development, economist Mariana Mazzucato similarly argues that the traditional “market failure” 
framework cannot explain the state’s “visionary” strategic investments in transformative technologies. 
See MAZZUCATO, supra note 7, at 21–22 (“Indeed, the discovery of the Internet or the emergence of 
the nanotechnology industry did not occur because the private sector wanted something but could not 
find the resources to invest in it. Both happened due to the vision that the government had in an area 
that had not yet been fathomed by the private sector . . . . It was—in these and many such cases—the 
State that appeared to have the most aggressive ‘animal spirits.’”).  
 53. There is a rich body of literature analyzing and evaluating various historical experiences with 
formulation and implementation of developmental strategies that inevitably have important 
distributional consequences. See generally sources cited supra note 4. 
 54. See generally ALEXANDER GERSCHENKRON, ECONOMIC BACKWARDNESS IN HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVE (1962) (discussing industrialization and economic development in “backward” 
countries). 
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design a national development policy is likely to generate particularly 
bitter conflicts. This Article does not purport to offer a particular template 
for such a policy or to advocate a specific plan for long-term national 
development. For our purposes, it is sufficient to emphasize that any 
successful strategy of national development must aim at ensuring 
sustainable long-term economic growth, creating a more stable and 
structurally-balanced economy, maintaining full employment, and 
achieving higher levels of socio-economic inclusion and cohesion.55 Free-
market exchange may be the best mechanism for promoting the innovation 
and entrepreneurship indispensable to economic growth but, contrary to 
market apologists’ claims, it does not automatically generate sustainable, 
socially inclusive modes of national development. Even at a high level of 
generalization, it is clear that some of the broad developmental goals 
outlined above will often clash with the single-minded pursuit of private 
profit by self-interested individuals. In that sense, ongoing national 
development is the ultimate public good that private actors under-provide. 
It embodies a normative vision of the nation’s future that seeks to balance 
various competing social and economic goals—a fundamentally political 
exercise.56 
The difficulty of this exercise, however, should not preclude us from 
advocating the need for it. Nor should it discourage us from making at 
least a preliminary attempt to envisage some of the elements of a 
potentially workable developmental strategy. Delineating a few discrete 
measures may help to fill this abstract notion with a more concrete 
meaning—and suggest the general direction in which the American 
developmental finance state can potentially evolve. 
 
 
 55. Despite their generality and potential contestability, these broadly stated goals serve as 
important signposts marking the conceptual boundary separating development as a bona fide national 
project from other, narrower, and often misleading, formulations. An example of the latter is the 
current preoccupation with US “global competitiveness” that is erroneously equated with continuous 
deregulation and lower taxation of private businesses. This one-sided version of global 
competitiveness cannot serve as a proxy or a substitute for a program of national development. 
Development cannot and should not be equated with rising corporate profits or stock market prices; 
nor can it be measured solely in terms of GDP or similar output metrics. Financialization, outsourcing 
of domestic jobs, decline of entire sectors of the economy and geographic regions, increasing 
inequality, stagnant wages and mounting consumer debt—these are some of the factors that must also 
be given significant weight in the deliberations on the US developmental trajectory. 
 56. It is worth re-emphasizing here that we view a developmental finance state as a mechanism, a 
tool for achieving substantive policy goals—but the content and the desired socio-economic impact of 
such policies should be determined through political deliberation. The degree of real-life success (or 
failure) of the developmental finance state depends on these fundamentally political choices that, 
among other things, raise questions of democratic legitimacy and distributive justice. An examination 
of these complex factors is beyond the scope of this Article. 
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We outline three potential extensions of public instrumentalities’ 
traditional market-making, market-moving, market-levering, and market-
preserving functions: (1) adoption of a broad asset-price stability 
maintenance program; (2) establishment of a public-private national 
infrastructure-funding vehicle; and (3) creation of a special government 
share in privately owned financial institutions.57 These proposals are likely 
to generate many questions we are not able to answer in this Article. Some 
may view them as an unacceptably radical departure from the existing 
economic and political “norm.” As discussed earlier, this perception may, 
at least in part, reflect a skewed understanding of what the American 
“norm” really is. Rather than providing a complete blueprint for action, 
our primary goal is to conduct a thought experiment: to envisage what a 
developmental finance state might look like in a 21st-century America that 
fully embraces its Hamiltonian heritage.  
II. PUBLIC ACTORS AS PARTICIPANTS IN FINANCIAL MARKETS: A 
TAXONOMY OF ROLES 
As discussed above, our notion of a developmental finance state is 
based on an explicit recognition of the fact that states and markets are not 
“separate but equal”—they are inseparable and deeply interconnected parts 
of the nation’s economic organism. Governments not only intervene in 
private economic activities from outside; they also directly conduct such 
activities as a means of achieving public policy goals. As a descriptive 
matter, this endogenous public participation in private markets in pursuit 
of explicitly public ends may take a wide variety of specific forms. For 
analytical purposes, we divide the universe of such forms into four main 
groups: “market-making,” “market-moving,” “market-levering,” and 
“market-preserving.”58 This Part elaborates on each of these four 
archetypal roles that public actors play when they act as direct financial 
market participants.  
A. Market-Making 
Markets require counterparties willing and able to enter into an 
exchange. That trivial truth carries important implications for the very 
possibility of markets. It can be costly, for example, to “take one’s goods 
 
 
 57. See infra Part III. 
 58. The discussion in this Part draws and expands on our earlier exploratory essay. See Hockett 
& Omarova, supra note 37. 
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to market.” A prospective seller’s decision to participate in a market 
exchange depends fundamentally on that person’s expectation that 
(1) there will be people at a particular location who (2) desire what he or 
she is ready to sell and (3) are able to pay for the desired items with other 
goods, services, or currencies that the seller is prepared to accept. If a 
potential seller does not know in advance that all of these conditions are 
likely to be met, he or she might not “go to the market.” Even if, in fact, 
there are willing and able prospective buyers for this hypothetical seller’s 
goods, the seller’s lack of knowledge of, or belief in, their availability will 
prevent a mutually beneficial exchange from taking place.  
Functionally, market-making seeks to avoid this potentially wasteful 
outcome. The market-maker helps to create and maintain market exchange 
of specific assets—goods, services, financial instruments—by ensuring the 
continuous availability of, and thereby inducing confidence in, prospective 
counterparties to every trade. To fulfill this function, the market-maker 
agrees to bear two complementary types of risk. One is the risk that the 
product in question does not actually sell. The market-maker assumes this 
risk by agreeing to serve as something akin to a “buyer of last resort.” In 
doing this, he or she engages in a form of underwriting—in this case, 
underwriting of a prospective seller’s risk. On the flipside, the market-
maker also assumes prospective buyers’ risk that there might not be 
adequate supplies of the product they wish to purchase in the market. The 
market-maker assumes this risk by maintaining inventories of, or access 
to, the product in question, and committing to sell units of the item to 
anyone willing to pay a predetermined price. Thus, by assuming both the 
sellers’ and the buyers’ risks, the market-maker averts the tragedy of 
needlessly missed opportunities for socially beneficial exchanges of goods 
and services.  
Perhaps the most readily recognizable form of the market-maker role 
exists in stock markets where designated professional intermediaries 
“make markets” in a particular security. Market-makers agree to do two 
things: (1) to purchase particular securities from anyone offering them at a 
stipulated “ask” price; and (2) to sell the same securities to anyone at a 
stipulated “bid” price. The difference between the bid and ask prices—the 
spread—is the market-maker’s compensation for the two-way risk it 
assumes by making these promises to all other market participants. In a 
normally-functioning, sufficiently liquid market, the market-maker may be 
able to manage its risks and generate sizeable profits. However, a 
significant market turbulence—when either prospective buyers or 
prospective sellers of particular securities unilaterally flee or, conversely, 
flood the market—may put the market-maker’s continuing ability to stand 
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by its promise to buy and sell those securities to a harsh and potentially 
fatal test.  
Given the risks inherent in the role of a market-maker, especially in 
financial instruments notoriously prone to dramatic and sudden price 
fluctuations, it is not surprising that market-makers have traditionally been 
“big” market actors endowed with substantial resources.59 In many 
instances, public instrumentalities have had to perform the market-making 
role, as private actors retreated from this unacceptably risky activity.60  
Although market-making is not an inherently governmental function, 
there are important reasons to believe that public instrumentalities 
(including, but not limited to, central banks) are particularly well-suited to 
perform that role. Thus, to the extent that market-making represents a 
canonical public good, it is inherently prone to under-provision by private 
actors, especially in times of market stress.61 Public instrumentalities, on 
the other hand, are instituted specifically to provide public goods. They are 
well-resourced and, as government actors, often able to tap into potentially 
significant additional financial capacity. Importantly, public 
instrumentalities are not driven by purely profit-making motives. In 
contrast to private market-makers, public entities’ primary motivation is 
fundamentally aligned with the public interest in maintaining a healthy 
market. Freedom from the harsh dictates of short-term profit-generation 
and loss-avoidance enables public actors to continuously make markets, 
even in the face of deteriorating market conditions.  
Several cases help to illustrate the importance of the government-as-
market-maker role in modern finance. The most conspicuous recent case is 
the role played by the Federal Reserve and the US Treasury as “market-
 
 
 59. One well-known example of an individual actor sometimes said to have been capable of 
performing the role of a heroic market-maker in the early twentieth century was John Pierpont 
Morgan. For an illuminating popular account of the role that Morgan played as a sort of private 
provider of public goods in the financial markets, particularly prior to the passage of the Federal 
Reserve Act in 1913, see RON CHERNOW, THE HOUSE OF MORGAN (2d ed. 2010); see also JEAN 
STROUSE, MORGAN: AMERICAN FINANCIER (1999). It should be noted that Morgan’s role as savior of 
the American financial system might have been exaggerated, especially in light of the government’s 
market-preserving efforts during the 1907 crisis. See, e.g., PETER CONTI-BROWN, ULYSSES AND THE 
CHAPERONE: THE INDEPENDENCE, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND GOVERNANCE OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE 
(forthcoming 2015).  
 60. For informative accounts of how the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England have recently 
and historically played such roles, see PERRY MEHRLING, THE NEW LOMBARD STREET: HOW THE FED 
BECAME THE DEALER OF LAST RESORT (2011); Gerard Hertig, Governments as Investors of Last 
Resort: Comparative Credit Crisis Case-Studies, 13 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 385 (2012). 
 61. For more on the familiar categories of market failure and public goods, see Francis M. Bator, 
The Anatomy of Market Failure, 72 Q. J. ECON. 351 (1958); Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of 
Public Expenditure, 36 REV. ECON. & STAT. 387 (1954). For more on market incompleteness, see 1 
MICHAEL MAGILL & MARTINE QUINZII, THEORY OF INCOMPLETE MARKETS (1996). 
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makers of last resort” during the worst of the 2008–2009 financial market 
crisis. The Federal Reserve established a number of dedicated emergency 
facilities specifically for that purpose.62 Treasury played its market-maker 
role through the legislatively authorized Troubled Asset Relief Program 
(“TARP”).63 The primary objective of these special facilities was to stave 
off a rapid panic-induced decline in the market price of certain financial 
assets—such as asset-backed securities (“ABSs”) and collateralized debt 
obligations (“CDOs”)—below what fundamentals appeared to warrant.64 
The Federal Reserve and Treasury publicly committed to purchase any 
such assets whose prices fell below a specified floor—that is, assets too 
toxic for any private buyers to touch.65 By standing ready, in the midst of 
an unfolding crisis, to buy the worst of the troubled financial assets and to 
absorb the immediate loss of value, the Federal Reserve and the US 
Treasury, in effect, became the market for such assets.66 
According to official reports, the government entities involved in these 
asset-purchase programs ultimately turned profits when, several years 
later, they sold off the purchased assets.67 Although not entirely free of 
controversy, that outcome confirmed the government’s original judgment 
that panic conditions had been the primary cause of severe under-
valuations of the relevant financial assets by private market participants. 
More importantly for the purposes of our argument, it vindicated the 
 
 
 62. Perhaps the best known special facility of this kind was the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York’s “Maiden Lane Fund” operations. See Maiden Lane Transactions, FED. RESERVE BANK OF 
N.Y., http://newyorkfed.org/markets/maidenlane.html (last visited June 28, 2015).  
 63. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. and 26 U.S.C.). For an official overview of the 
Credit Market Program under TARP, see Credit Market Programs, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/TARP-Programs/credit-market-programs/Pages/ 
default.aspx (last updated Aug. 13, 2015).  
 64. For a more detailed explanation of the specific mechanisms of this contagious and 
prophetically self-amplifying drop in value across entire classes of financial assets, see GARY B. 
GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND: THE PANIC OF 2007 (2010). 
 65. See, e.g., Maya Jackson Randall & Michael R. Crittenden, Treasury Unveils Toxic-Asset 
Plan, Citing ‘Acute Pressure’ on Banks, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 24, 2009, 2:56 PM), http://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/SB123780994825213465; What Are the Federal Reserve’s Large-Scale Asset Purchases?, BD. 
OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., http://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/what-are-the-federal-
reserves-large-scale-asset-purchases.htm (last updated Oct. 28, 2015); see also Jose Gabilondo, 
Financial Hospitals: Defending the Fed’s Role as a Market Maker of Last Resort, 36 SEATTLE U. L. 
REV. 731, 737–38 (2013) (arguing that the Federal Reserve has effectively constructed markets in 
moribund assets).  
 66. See Gabilondo, supra note 65. 
 67. According to the U.S. Treasury, as of September 2015, “cumulative collections under TARP, 
together with Treasury’s additional proceeds from the sale of non-TARP shares of AIG, exceed[ed] 
total disbursements by more than $12 billion.” TARP Programs, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/TARP-Programs/Pages/default.aspx (last updated 
Oct. 14, 2015). 
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proposition that market-making can prevent transitory liquidity crises from 
morphing into avoidable—hence, classically “tragic”—permanent 
solvency crises. In this sense, the US government entities’ direct market-
making role doubled as a justifiable market-preserving role, discussed 
below.68  
Indeed, this type of last-resort market-making, which could only be 
conducted by government entities, functioned as a substitute for, and an 
extension of, the classic last-resort lending role originally articulated by 
Walter Bagehot in describing Bank of England operations during the 
nineteenth century.69 This evolution of central banks’ traditional liquidity 
back-up function reflects and underscores a fundamental evolution in 
modern financial markets. Today’s markets for capital are significantly 
disintermediated, so that lending is securitized to a much more significant 
degree than it was in Bagehot’s day.70 That explains why, in the twenty-
first century, directly buying and selling financial instruments may be a 
more effective—perhaps even inevitable—method of government market-
aiding intervention than the more familiar technique of extending 
emergency loans to banks.71  
Government’s role as a direct market-maker, however, is not confined 
to relatively short-lived emergency situations. A good example of public 
entities’ long-term market-making role is the creation and maintenance of 
secondary markets in certain debt instruments—home mortgages and 
student loans—by government-sponsored enterprises (“GSEs”). The 
securitization of home mortgage lending in the United States effectively 
began circa 1938, with the establishment of the first-ever large-scale 
mortgage loan purchaser, the Federal National Mortgage Association 
(“Fannie Mae”).72 The ultimate purpose served by this pioneering 
government program, instituted in the midst of the Great Depression, was 
to make home mortgage lending more attractive to banking institutions by 
 
 
 68. See infra Part II.D. 
 69. See WALTER BAGEHOT, LOMBARD STREET: A DESCRIPTION OF THE MONEY MARKET viii–ix, 
27, 255–57 (John Wiley & Sons 1999) (1873); see generally MEHRLING, supra note 60 (describing the 
role of a “lender of last resort”). 
 70. For a basic definition of disintermediation, see DAVID L. SCOTT, WALL STREET WORDS: AN 
A TO Z GUIDE TO INVESTMENT TERMS FOR TODAY’S INVESTOR (2003). 
 71. For a recent discussion of the modern central banks’ role as lenders of last resort, see Paul 
Tucker, The Lender of Last Resort and Modern Central Banking: Principles and Reconstruction, 79 
BIS PAPERS 10 (2014), available at http://www.igmchicago.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Tucker-
P-2014-LOLR-and-modern-central-banking-BIS-Papers-No-79.pdf.  
 72. For more on securitization, see Kenneth C. Kettering, Securitization and Its Discontents: The 
Dynamics of Financial Product Development, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1553 (2008); Jonathan C. Lipson, 
Re: Defining Securitization, 85 S. CALIF. L. REV. 1229 (2012). 
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establishing a secondary market in which private banks unwilling to keep 
home loans on their balance sheets could quickly sell those loans 
(provided that the loans were of sufficiently high quality).73 That would, in 
turn, lower the cost of home mortgage credit in the primary markets, 
ultimately jumpstarting the Depression-struck building industry in the 
short term and fostering broader, more stable home-ownership in the long 
term.74  
Until the 1990s, this system worked well, boosting the domestic 
employment-inducing construction industry and converting the United 
States from a nation in which 46% of households owned their own homes 
to one in which nearly 20% more than that did.75 Fannie Mae was so 
successful that, by the 1960s, it could be privatized, with the Federal 
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (“Freddie Mac”) and Government 
National Mortgage Association (“Ginnie Mae”) established to act as its 
competitors.76 In recent decades, however, this market became 
increasingly dysfunctional. A discussion of the numerous factors that 
contributed to the unhealthy dynamics and ultimate implosion of the US 
mortgage market in 2008 is beyond the scope of this Article.77 For 
purposes of our argument, it is worth emphasizing that a critical factor in 
this respect was the massive inflow in the 1990s to the early 2000s of new 
types of unregulated or lightly regulated private market players—mortgage 
lenders and securitizers—aggressively pursuing speculative short-term 
 
 
 73. For an overview of the history and functions of Fannie Mae and other GSEs, see generally 
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, CONG. OF THE UNITED STATES, FANNIE MAE, FREDDIE MAC, AND THE 
FEDERAL ROLE IN THE SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKET (2010); TIMOTHY HOWARD, THE 
MORTGAGE WARS: INSIDE FANNIE MAE, BIG-MONEY POLITICS, AND THE COLLAPSE OF THE 
AMERICAN DREAM (2013); see also A Jeffersonian Republic, supra note 30, at 104–20. It should be 
noted that accounts differ on the question of whether the ultimate purposes that Fannie Mae came to 
serve were foreseen and intended from the outset, or only came to be fully appreciated later, after it 
had been established as an ad hoc response to a temporary exigency. For the more purposeful 
interpretation, see id. and sources cited therein. For a more “stumbled into it” account, see Public 
Option, supra note 45. 
 74. For more on this history, see A Jeffersonian Republic, supra note 30, at 104–20; see also 
David Min, How Government Guarantees Promote Housing Finance Stability, 50 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 
437 (2013) (examining the evolution of the US housing finance system). 
 75. See supra note 74. As noted in A Jeffersonian Republic, supra note 30, at 116–17, the figure 
had reached 63% by 1970. The peak was nearly 70% in 2004, while the 50-year average to now has 
been a bit over 65%. See, e.g., Diana Olick, Homeownership Rate Drops to 63.4%, Lowest Since 1967, 
CNBC (July 28, 2015, 10:36 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/07/28/.  
 76. For a fuller account of this history, see FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL 
AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES 38–45 (2011) [hereinafter FCIC REPORT]. 
 77. For an insightful analysis of these dysfunctions, see Adam J. Levitin & Susan M. Wachter, 
Explaining the Housing Bubble, 100 GEO. L.J. 1177 (2012). 
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profits to the detriment of mortgage loan quality.78 Their originate-to-
distribute model of mortgage lending was designed to exploit the presence 
of the still mammoth and implicitly publicly-backed GSEs.79 Ironically, as 
privately-owned corporations, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac proved unable 
to resist market pressure to join in the subprime mortgage game that 
eventually forced both of them into conservatorship.80  
The key point for our purposes is not so much the recent failure of 
privatized GSEs but the undeniable success of the publicly-created 
secondary market in home loans over a long span of several decades after 
its creation. This model of public market-making was also expressly 
embraced as the blueprint for US federal higher education finance policy. 
Created in the early 1970s, the SLM Corporation (“Sallie Mae”) is a GSE 
that makes a secondary market in student loans.81 In direct parallel to 
Fannie Mae’s experience, the fully publicly-owned Sallie Mae greatly 
increased Americans’ access to higher education—while, since Sallie 
Mae’s privatization in 2005, matters have taken a more ominous turn.82 
This brief overview of public instrumentalities’ market-making 
activities also highlights the special significance of government-induced 
standardization of market products and practices—a form of what we call 
market-levering, discussed below—in facilitating the task of market-
 
 
 78. Unregulated mortgage lenders filled the vacuum left by the collapse of the savings-and-loan 
industry in the late 1980s. Similarly, private securitizers filled the market void when the accounting 
scandals of the early 2000s forced Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to scale back their operations. See 
FCIC REPORT, supra note 76, at 102–26; see also Robert Hockett, A Fixer-Upper for Finance, 87 
WASH. U. L. REV. 1213, 1255–62 (2010) [hereinafter A Fixer-Upper for Finance]. 
 79. Pursuant to the “originate-to-distribute” model, mortgage lenders extended loans to home-
buyers not with a view to holding the loans in their portfolios and collecting monthly mortgage 
payments thereafter, but with a view to selling the loans and associated payment-receipt rights to 
secondary investors. This practice, which grew rapidly over the course of the 1990s, rendered 
mortgage credit less expensive to homebuyers, but also rendered ultimate creditors more vulnerable to 
failures of due diligence on the part of loan originators. See, e.g., Michael Simkovic, Competition and 
Crisis in Mortgage Securitization, 88 IND. L.J. 213 (2013) (arguing that the massive entry of private-
label mortgage securitizers in the mid-2000s led to dramatic deterioration in underwriting standards 
and thus created perverse incentives for loan originators). 
 80. There is a plausible argument that privatizing the GSEs introduced a potentially fatal internal 
contradiction in their design as market-makers by fundamentally re-orienting them toward pursuit of 
private shareholder profits. See Public Option, supra note 45, at 1119. For a more general discussion 
of the positive and negative effects of delegating public functions to private actors, see FINANCIAL 
GATEKEEPERS: CAN THEY PROTECT INVESTORS? (Yasuyuki Fuchita & Robert E. Litan eds., 2006); 
Jody Freeman, Private Parties, Public Functions and the New Administrative Law, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 
813 (2000). 
 81. For more on Sallie Mae, see History, SALLIEMAE, https://www.salliemae.com/about/who-
we-are/history/ (last visited July 6, 2015). 
 82. See ROBERT HOCKETT & RICHARD VAGUE, DEBT, DEFLATION, AND DEBACLE: OF PRIVATE 
DEBT WRITE-DOWN AND PUBLIC RECOVERY (2013), available at http://www.interdependence.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/04/Debt-Deflation-and-Debacle-RV-and-RH1.pdf.  
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making.83 For example, one factor that enabled the development of 
secondary markets in both home and student loans was the government 
guarantee of primary market debt. In the case of housing finance, this has 
taken the form of mortgage default insurance provided by the Federal 
Housing Administration (“FHA”) since 1934.84 In the case of higher 
education finance, it has taken the form of express government guarantees 
of student loans since the late 1950s. As described below, these public 
guarantees levered primary markets into secondary markets, in great part, 
via the product standardization effect of conditioning the guarantee on 
specific eligibility criteria.85 This example illustrates how individual 
market-actor roles identified in our taxonomy, in practice, may facilitate 
one another and constitute an integrated strategy. 
B. Market-Moving 
The ideal of the free, competitive private market rests on a fundamental 
assumption that no single market participant—acting either as a buyer or 
as a seller—is able to exercise sufficient power to move the price of a 
particular good. Individual market actors are meant to lack market power 
and act as “price-takers,” not “price-makers:” they are meant to pay what 
the market requires and sell what the market will bear at the market 
price.86 The notorious hand that governs the market is invisible only to the 
extent that no private market actor can single-handedly move it. 
Implicit in this idealized picture is the view of the private market as an 
inherently democratic and distributively just form of value determination. 
Assuming rough equality of bargaining power—hence, of initial 
endowments—among participants, the price outputs of markets in which 
everyone is a price-taker can jointly constitute a “social cost” metric 
derived by just, democratic means. The price of an apple in terms of 
oranges under conditions of market equality will reflect both the 
comparative bounty of objective nature in respect of apples and oranges, 
and the comparative valuation of apples and oranges by subjective 
 
 
 83. See infra Part II.C. 
 84. The Federal Housing Administration (FHA), U.S. DEPT. OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., 
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program_offices/housing/fhahistory (last visited June 28, 
2015); see also A Jeffersonian Republic, supra note 30, at 110–13; Public Option, supra note 45, at 
1137–42. 
 85. See infra Part II.C. 
 86. For more on this ideal, see Robert Hockett, The Deep Grammar of Distribution: A Meta-
Theory of Justice, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1179 (2005); Robert Hockett, Whose Ownership? Which 
Society?, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (2005). 
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individuals whose voluntary expenditure votes all count equally in 
determining relative prices.87 
Although real-life markets depart from this picture, it is easy to 
appreciate both the attraction of the picture as an ideal and the sense in 
which market-moving capacity held by an individual, or a group of 
colluding individuals, might offend it. To use an extreme example, if one 
person accumulates control over half of the world’s wealth and develops 
an eccentric taste for apples, his concentrated use of purchasing power in 
the apple market will distort the price of apples for everyone else. A single 
powerful individual, in effect, will disturb the proper order of things 
envisioned in the competitive market ideal by forcing us to subsidize 
satisfaction of his eccentric taste via the higher price we all pay for apples. 
Things look even worse if that same super-rich person employs his 
extraordinary market power, not because he craves apples, but because he 
seeks to influence the price of apples in order to manipulate prices of other 
goods or services in a way that increases the profitability of his operations 
in such related markets.88 Fundamentally, market-moving actions of this 
sort appear suspect because they offend the democratic values from which 
we derive the competitive market ideal.  
However, market-moving can also serve public, not narrowly private, 
purposes and provide socially-beneficial solutions to specific collective 
action problems plaguing the market. Indeed, government 
instrumentalities routinely engage in various forms of market-moving. 
Perhaps the most familiar example of such routine market-moving in 
modern financial markets is that of the so-called open market operations 
(“OMO”) in which central banks or monetary authorities purchase or sell 
government debt securities.89 The Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
(“FRBNY”) conducts active open market operations by trading, on a daily 
basis, US Treasury bonds—the federal government’s debt backed by the 
 
 
 87. This is the ethical intuition behind so-called Equal Division Walrasian Equilibria (“EDWE”), 
as these figure into the work of some thoughtful egalitarian economists and justice theorists. See 
generally Robert Hockett, Taking Distribution Seriously (Cornell Law Sch., Legal Studies Research 
Paper No. 08-004, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1108217; 
Robert Hockett & Mathias Risse, Primary Goods Revisited: The “Political Problem” and Its Rawlsian 
Solution (Cornell Law Sch., Legal Studies Research Paper No. 06-030, 2003), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=931048. 
 88. An analogy can be drawn between this folksy hypothetical and an actual possibility that some 
financial institutions might trade physical commodities to bend yield curves in commodity derivative 
markets in which the same institutions also hold positions. See Saule T. Omarova, The Merchants of 
Wall Street: Banking, Commerce, and Commodities, 98 MINN. L. REV. 265, 347–49 (2013).  
 89. See Hockett & Omarova, supra note 37, at 65. 
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full faith and credit of the United States.90 Through massive purchases and 
sales, the central bank seeks to influence holdings of these key financial 
assets by private financial institutions and, accordingly, the supply of 
credit and money in the broader economy.91 Monetary policy is the 
principal lever through which the government seeks to stabilize the pricing 
of consumer goods and services and employment levels economy-wide.92  
During the recent financial crisis, central banks in the world’s leading 
economies significantly expanded their traditional open market operations 
to amplify their market-moving capacity. Thus, under the so-called 
“quantitative easing” (“QE”) program, the Federal Reserve (via FRBNY) 
commenced buying and selling a wider range of financial instruments, in 
addition to US Treasury bonds, for the purpose of shoring up the prices of 
particularly vulnerable or important asset classes—and shaping the overall 
credit conditions more forcefully.93  
While this is no place for a comprehensive evaluation of QE, it is 
important to note that the example of QE shows how market-moving can 
operationally overlap with market-making: in both cases, the government 
actor commits to buying or selling as a means of influencing market 
behavior. Insofar as the government actor effectively becomes the only 
viable buyer of certain financial assets, its market-moving functions can 
also overlap with market-preserving, discussed below. 
C. Market-Levering 
In some situations, private markets operate in a less than socially 
optimal manner. Thus, a particular market may exist only in an 
underdeveloped or incipient form, unable to grow beyond a certain limit. 
Another market may be quite extensive and well-developed but capable of 
delivering still greater public benefits if augmented, altered, or supported 
in particular ways for particular purposes. Yet other markets or institutions 
may not be initially expected to produce certain public goods but, with 
some subtle alteration, may start doing so. In all such cases, public 
 
 
 90. For more information on the FRBNY’s open market operations, see Domestic Market 
Operations, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/openmarket.html (last 
visited June 28, 2015).  
 91. For a description of the mechanism of open-market operations and the workings of monetary 
policy, see ANN-MARIE MEULENDYKE, U.S. MONETARY POLICY AND FINANCIAL MARKETS 163–88 
(1998). 
 92. See id. 
 93. See Federal Reserve Launches QE3, CNNMONEY (Sept. 13, 2012, 3:57 PM), http://money. 
cnn.com/2012/09/13/news/economy/federal-reserve-qe3/index.html. 
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instrumentalities may unlock or amplify existing private markets’ capacity 
to benefit the broader economy, by acting either directly within these 
target markets or in adjacent markets. 
For instance, private financial markets might be able to provide access 
to relatively reliable and affordable banking services or deposit, flood, or 
loan default insurance. The availability of these financial products 
increases liquidity and growth in many sectors of the economy and, thus, 
constitutes an important public good. Nevertheless, it might be possible to 
enjoy these public benefits on a much larger scale and/or at much lower 
expense if there were but some form of secondary market or higher-order 
risk-pooling arrangement augmenting the primary market. The 
augmenting market or arrangement in question, however, might lie beyond 
the scope of private parties’ capacities to provide at a given stage of 
economic development. Or it might, for some time at least, be widely 
believed to lie beyond those capacities. In such a case public provision or 
facilitation of the much-needed arrangement might “lever” the primary 
market into something more beneficial than it can otherwise be.  
American economic history provides numerous examples of this 
phenomenon. For a long time, both home mortgage and student loan 
insurance were considered too risky to be underwritten by private parties. 
Active markets in these products emerged only when government 
instrumentalities, with their greater risk-bearing capacities, began 
providing these services directly: the FHA commenced underwriting 
mortgage default insurance in the 1930s, while the first government-
guaranteed student loans (“GSLs”) appeared in the 1950s.94 The 
availability of these new risk-transfer channels was an enormous boost to 
primary markets for home and student loans: reducing lenders’ risk 
lowered borrowing costs and brought rapid market expansion. The 
government intentionally levered these particular loan markets to enable a 
far greater flow of private money to fund growth in homeownership and 
educational advancement. 
Another familiar example of the critical market-levering function 
performed by the government as the ultimate risk-bearer is the federal 
deposit insurance provided by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
 
 
 94. See History of Federal Student Loan Programs, NEW AM. FOUND., http://febp.newamerica. 
net/background-analysis/federal-student-loan-programs-history (last updated July 7, 2015) (noting that 
in 1958, the “First federal student loan program [was] established by the National Defense Education 
Act”).  
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(“FDIC”) since 1933.95 The first modern deposit-guarantee scheme of its 
kind, federal deposit insurance was designed as a solution to the systemic 
vulnerability of the US banking sector to potentially catastrophic creditor 
runs.96 As the public risk-bearer of last resort, the FDIC guarantees private 
banks’ liabilities to their depositors, effectively substituting the US 
government’s full faith and credit for individual banks’ credit.97 For 
decades now, the FDIC insurance has been functioning to ensure a steady 
flow of low-cost depositor funds into the banking system, thus levering the 
national market for bank deposits.98 
As these examples show, the market-levering role often closely 
resembles the market-making role in its risk-resolving, public good-
providing, capital-expanding characteristics. In some cases, however, the 
levering role takes a slightly different, more subtle form. For example, 
public instrumentalities frequently perform important standard-setting or 
related coordination problem-solving functions by creating specific criteria 
for private goods they favor in their capacity as influential market 
participants. This type of market-wide standardization optimizes pre-
existing private market infrastructure in a manner that increases the 
availability of public goods at a lower cost than is otherwise possible. 
For instance, before the FHA began its operations in 1934, the standard 
industry practice in the United States was the extension of home loans 
with a maturity of two to three years.99 Forced continuously to refinance 
their short-term mortgages, many American homeowners had to live under 
a constant threat of losing their homes due to the lack of affordable re-
financing options. The newly established FHA generated a revolutionary 
shift in market practice by encouraging the adoption of a 30-year fixed-
 
 
 95. For an overview of the history of the FDIC, see History of the FDIC, FED. DEPOSIT INS. 
CORP., https://www.fdic.gov/about/history/index.html (last updated Dec. 16, 2014).  
 96. See generally Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and 
Liquidity, 91 J. POL. ECON. 401 (1983) (analyzing the general dynamics of bank runs). 
 97. Since 2010, the FDIC insurance covers the first $250,000 of deposited funds, per depositor, 
per account. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(1)(E) (2014).  
 98. It is worth acknowledging that the FDIC insurance also has potentially negative effects on 
financial markets, for example, by creating significant moral hazard problems. The pervasive nature of 
these problems and the difficulty of estimating the market-distorting effects of the public subsidy 
became intensely debated academic and policy issues in the wake of the recent financial crisis. See, 
e.g., Franklin Allen et al., Government Guarantees and Financial Stability (Ctr. for Econ. Pol’y 
Research, Discussion Paper No. DP10560, 2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=2599552##; John Crawford, The Moral Hazard Paradox of Financial Safety Nets, 25 
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL. (forthcoming 2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=2580062; Steven L. Schwarcz, Too Big To Fail?: Recasting the Financial Safety Net, 
in THE PANIC OF 2008: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR REFORM 94 (Lawrence E. 
Mitchell & Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr. eds., 2010). 
 99. See A Jeffersonian Republic, supra note 30, at 105. See also HOWARD, supra note 73, at 19. 
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rate mortgage loan as the new industry standard. The FHA successfully 
used its power as the national provider of mortgage default insurance to 
create a new standardized loan product that greatly increased the demand 
for home loans. Moreover, the agency’s standard-setting actions played a 
critical role in facilitating the subsequent creation of the national 
secondary market for home loans—an example of the government’s 
market-making role discussed above.100 The Federal GSL program that 
begun in 1965 (and was later renamed the Stafford Loan program) played 
a similar role in setting standards for student loans.101 In both cases, the 
government-led product standardization and creation of vibrant secondary 
markets significantly reduced risk to private lenders and costs to 
borrowers, thus, unlocking these primary markets’ full growth potential.102 
This ability of large public actors to set market-wide standards in a way 
that increases the benefits to society of private actors’ profit-seeking 
behavior is a potentially powerful market-levering tool. 
D. Market-Preserving 
Private markets driven by the fundamental logic of supply-and-demand 
are inherently prone to destabilizing boom-and-bust cycles. Financial 
markets are especially fragile in this respect.103 Liquidity is the oxygen 
that keeps financial markets alive.104 It is also the first thing that 
evaporates when asset price bubbles reach outer limits and markets begin 
showing their first signs of distress. As prices of distressed financial assets 
fall, often with frightening speed, and prices of “safe” replacement assets 
skyrocket, markets for both “bad” and “good” asset types can seize up. 
Massive runs on, and emergency fire sales of, distressed assets can lead to 
the complete disappearance of markets for such assets. Absent some 
breathing room offered by temporary liquidity provision, liquidity shocks 
can quickly morph into full-on solvency crises, followed by protracted 
periods of credit contraction and depression of economic activity. The 
 
 
 100. See supra Part II.A. 
 101. See History of Federal Student Loan Programs, supra note 94. 
 102. There are numerous additional examples of public actors’ success in changing industry 
standards, enumerating which is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 103. For insightful analyses of financial booms and busts throughout human history, see ERIK F. 
GERDING, LAW, BUBBLES, AND FINANCIAL REGULATION (2014); CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER & 
ROBERT Z. ALIBER, MANIAS, PANICS, AND CRASHES: A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL CRISES (2011). 
 104. See Timothy F. Geithner, President & Chief Exec. Officer, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 
Keynote Address at the 8th Annual Risk Convention and Exhibition: Liquidity and Financial Markets 
(Feb. 28, 2007), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2007/gei070228.html 
(“Liquidity plays a central role in the functioning of financial markets.”). 
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dramatic events of 2008–2009 in the US and European financial markets 
aptly revealed these dynamics. 
Temporary injection of liquidity can potentially forestall the movement 
from liquidity crisis to solvency crisis because, fundamentally, financial 
panics represent what may be called “recursive collective action 
problems.”105 Generally, a collective action problem is a situation in which 
multiple individually rational decisions lead to collectively self-defeating 
outcomes.106 The problem is recursive when it bears feedback properties, 
such that movement in a particular direction tends to induce further 
movement in the same direction, ending at no satisfactory equilibrium.107  
Asset price bubbles and busts are true recursive collective action 
problems in this sense. When credit is abundant and borrowing costs are 
correspondingly low, it can be individually rational to borrow in order to 
buy assets whose prices are rising. The aggregate effect of such 
individually rational behavior, however, is irrational and unsustainable: 
investors drive prices even higher, inducing more borrowing, more 
buying, more price rises, in a continuous spiral of excessive risk and 
leverage accumulation. When credit finally dries up, the process moves 
into reverse: rational individuals simultaneously rush to sell assets whose 
prices are falling, which pushes those prices even lower, leading to 
defaults on borrowings, further contraction of credit, and more asset 
sales.108 
It is at this point that temporary provision of liquidity can break the 
downward spiraling of asset prices. Essentially, busts constitute collective 
undershooting—just as booms constitute collective overshooting—of 
fundamental asset value.109 If, during a panic, undershooting can be 
arrested in its tracks until heads cool, value can be salvaged, harm can be 
minimized, and credit can be expected to flow again sooner. The problem 
is that no individual market participant typically can afford to wait to find 
 
 
 105. This phenomenon is identified and examined in depth in Robert Hockett, Recursive 
Collective Action Problems: The Structure of Procyclicality in Financial and Monetary Markets, 
Macroeconomies, and Formally Similar Contexts, 3 J. FIN. PERSP. (forthcoming 2015) [hereinafter 
Recursive Collective Action Problems]. 
 106. See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND 
THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965) (expounding a theory of group behavior).  
 107. See Recursive Collective Action Problems, supra note 105. 
 108. See KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note 103, at 26–38 (describing the process); Robert 
Hockett, Bailouts, Buy-Ins, and Ballyhoo, 52 CHALLENGE 36, 47 (2009) (same); Robert Hockett, 
Bubbles, Busts, and Blame?, CORNELL L.F., Spring 2011, at 14 (same). 
 109. “Fundamental” asset value generally refers to value that is sustainable in the long-term. For 
more on how it can be estimated, see infra Part III.A.1.  
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out whether he or she is undershooting: he or she must sell before others’ 
sales drive asset prices yet lower.110 
A public instrumentality performing a market-preserving (or market-
backstopping) role—in this case, a specific variation on the market-
making theme—can slow down the panic and minimize collective 
undershooting. A public entity commanding sufficient resources and 
unconstrained by the single-minded logic of individual-investor rationality 
can credibly commit to act as a lender or purchaser of last resort, 
notwithstanding prevailing market sentiment. By doing so, the entity in 
question will be acting as a collective agent solving a recursive—and thus 
particularly destructive and destabilizing—collective action problem.  
Some recent examples of public actors’ market-preserving role were 
already mentioned in the preceding discussion of market-making.111 Both 
Treasury’s actions under TARP and the Federal Reserve’s emergency 
liquidity provision and market-making operations in 2008–2009 
represented a concerted campaign by the federal government to backstop 
financial markets.112 There are also other examples of public 
instrumentalities’ market-preserving actions. For instance, Fannie Mae, 
with some help from FHA and the other mortgage finance GSEs, is 
presently nearly the sole secondary purchaser of (qualifying) new home 
mortgage loans.113 The virtual disappearance of the private secondary 
market since our most recent crisis means that Fannie Mae is the principal 
underwriter of the continued existence of the primary mortgage market 
itself. Another example is the third round of the Federal Reserve’s 
quantitative easing policy (“QE3”) that was announced in September 2012 
partly with a view to assisting the GSEs in their mortgage-market 
preservation effort.114 An example less reminiscent of market-making and 
market-moving is the role played by the US government in preserving the 
US automobile manufacturing sector during 2008–2009.115 By extending 
temporary credit and affording time for necessary restructuring when no 
private actor was able to do so, the federal government preserved, from the 
supply side, the market for domestically manufactured automobiles.  
 
 
 110. See, e.g., JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, 
AND MONEY 147–64 (Palgrave Macmillan 2007) (1936) (describing the psychology of manic buying 
and panic selling in asset markets afflicted by radical uncertainty). 
 111. See supra Part II.A. 
 112. See supra notes 62–66 and accompanying text. 
 113. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 73, at 7; Min, supra note 74.  
 114. See supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
 115. See, e.g., David E. Sanger et al., Bush Aids Detroit, but Hard Choices Wait for Obama, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 19, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/20/business/20auto.html?_r=3&hp&.  
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This last example highlights a deeply controversial aspect of the 
government’s market-preserving role: the fact that, in practice, the act of 
backstopping a particular market often involves bailing out specific private 
actors whose reckless profit-seeking behavior brought the market to the 
verge of collapse. Massive bailouts of private Wall Street firms during the 
recent financial crisis generated a lot of criticism, from both sides of the 
political spectrum.116 The controversy raises important normative 
questions about the proper design, execution, and limits of crisis-driven 
market interventions by the government.117 For our purposes, however, it 
is critical to emphasize that market-preserving is a necessary function of 
private markets’ own operative logic and, as such, cannot and should not 
be reduced only to politically salient—and often rushed—crisis-time 
bailouts and nationalizations.  
Taking a conceptual view of market-preserving as a legitimate category 
in the taxonomy of government roles as a direct market participant allows 
us to place the debate on private-firm bailouts in a broader context. Once 
we understand the purpose and place of market-preserving as a market-
actor function of the government, we can envision new ways for the 
government to perform that function, which go beyond the familiar—and 
controversial—crisis-driven emergency measures.118 In that sense, a 
taxonomy of government market-actor roles provides an analytical 
framework for potentially expanding the existing toolkit of public action 
in private markets. Such purposeful, deliberate expansion would 
potentially move us closer toward the new model of a more far-reaching 
and ambitious developmental finance state. 
III. THE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTAL FINANCE STATE: EXTENDING THE 
ROLE OF PUBLIC ACTORS IN FINANCIAL MARKETS  
As the preceding Part shows, government instrumentalities actively 
participate in private markets as endogenous actors performing a variety of 
roles. On the surface, government actions are indistinguishable from 
actions of private market participants: they buy, sell, lend, borrow, insure, 
and securitize. Fundamentally, however, what sets these public actors 
apart is their express orientation toward using private market operations 
primarily in order to achieve public policy goals. Government 
instrumentalities are, among other things, indispensable market contrarians 
 
 
 116. See infra notes 203–12 and accompanying text. 
 117. Id. 
 118. See infra Part III.C. 
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capable of acting counter-cyclically when no private actor can afford to do 
so. These public actors use their built-in advantages—size, funding, long-
term investment horizon, legal privileges, etc.—to overcome various 
instances of what economists refer to as market failure and to provide so-
called public goods under-provided by private actors, while also affording 
benefits not easily captured by those orthodox welfare-economic 
categories.119  
As noted earlier, our provisional taxonomy of government-as-market-
actor roles does not purport to be all-encompassing. In constructing it, we 
focused on the few most conspicuous and familiar examples of public 
action in financial markets and almost certainly left out important 
examples of public actors playing one or more of the identified market-
actor roles—or additional ones—both in the sphere of finance and outside 
of it. In part, the difficulty of compiling a complete list of all such 
examples may result from the lack of a clear conceptual framework 
recognizing the commonalities among disparate, and often insufficiently 
individuated, practices of various public actors. Government entities 
themselves may be reluctant to define their actions in terms of any single, 
concerted market-actor strategy, to avoid accusations of illegitimately 
interfering in free markets.120 It is a sad reflection on the current state of 
our polity that the government’s activities as a direct market participant 
are simultaneously taken for granted and feared. As a result, the 
government’s potentially transformative role as an endogenous market 
participant remains, to a great extent, both hidden and significantly 
constrained.121 
Our hope is that providing an analytical framework and operational 
vocabulary will enable a more systematic study and recognition of existing 
practices. More importantly, however, our goal is to lay the conceptual 
groundwork for a more proactive, assertive, and creative use of the 
government-as-market-actor modality in pursuit of a broader set of public 
policy objectives.  
 
 
 119. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
 120. This statement, of course, does not apply to emergency crisis-containment measures, when 
governments openly act in their market-preserving capacity and often portray their actions as part of a 
deliberate strategy. It is telling, however, that even in the midst of the latest financial crisis, when the 
US government had to take equity stakes in failing private firms, it took pains to emphasize its deep 
reluctance to continue such direct interference in private enterprise beyond the minimum time horizon. 
 121. Fred Block has described the role of ideological and political factors in explaining the 
similarly “hidden” nature of the federal government’s evolving capacity to finance and support private 
entrepreneurs’ efforts to commercialize new technologies. See Block, supra note 7, at 182–86. 
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Again, our primary focus is on financial markets and instruments. As 
discussed earlier, finance is both a critical area and a powerful tool of 
national development.122 The potentially transformative power of finance 
is especially evident in the United States, with its modern industrialized 
economy, deep pools of investors, well-developed markets, and stable 
legal institutions supporting them. As Part II shows, at least since the New 
Deal era, public entities have been active participants in US financial 
markets. In this Part, we will build upon this experience to suggest how 
government instrumentalities’ powers as endogenous market actors can be 
used in a more deliberate and expansive fashion, to channel private 
financial resources toward more ambitious public ends: continuous, 
sustainable development against a backdrop of financial and broader 
macroeconomic stability.123 
In the aftermath of the latest global financial crisis, it is evident that 
ensuring financial and broader macroeconomic stability is a critically 
important public policy priority and a prerequisite for successful long-term 
development.124 The crisis demonstrated how extreme financial instability 
can destroy vast amounts of wealth and lead to protracted economic 
recession (hence, lost output), both nationally and globally. Accordingly, 
we argue that using the state’s market-actor capacity in a way that actively 
seeks to minimize financial and macro-economic instability is an integral 
part of an effective development strategy. Rather than merely correcting 
specific instances of market failure, the purpose of government 
intervention in financial markets should be defined in terms of proactive 
prevention of systemic instability. 
In this Part, we outline three potential extensions of public 
instrumentalities’ traditional market-making, market-moving, market-
levering, and market-preserving functions: (1) adoption of a broader asset-
price stability maintenance program; (2) establishment of a public-private 
national infrastructure-funding vehicle; and (3) creation of a special 
government share in privately owned financial institutions. As thought 
experiments, these proposals inevitably lack in organizational detail and 
are likely to generate at least as many questions as answers. The principal 
purpose of this intellectual exercise, however, is not to offer blueprints but 
 
 
 122. See supra Part I. 
 123. For a discussion of the significance of national development as a continuous project, see 
supra Part I.B. 
 124. We use the term “stability” broadly, to refer generally to smoothing out market cycles and 
avoiding excessive price fluctuations. 
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to test the policy-shaping potential of our provisional model of a 
developmental finance state. 
A. Market-Making and Market-Moving: “OMO Plus” 
We start by discussing potential extensions of public actors’ traditional 
market-making and market-moving functions. As noted earlier, the 
FRBNY’s open market operations, or OMO, offer a classic example of the 
government actor making and, more importantly, moving the market for 
borrowed funds.125 Generally, public instrumentalities seek to move 
market prices when both (1) the prices in question bear special systemic 
significance to the economy at large, and (2) certain market dysfunctions 
impair the ability of individual private actors to generate stable prices 
within the range that is considered publicly desirable.126 In the context of 
OMO, the price being moved by the FRBNY—the prevailing money 
rental (i.e., “interest”) rate—has critical economy-wide importance. 
Private actors are not able to keep that rate consistently and reliably within 
acceptable ranges, in large part due to recursive collective action problems 
known as credit-fueled asset price bubbles and busts.127 Importantly, the 
FRBNY turns over all profits generated through OMO to the US 
Treasury.128  
However, there are at least two additional types of prices that are of 
critical significance for the national economy: (1) prices of financial assets 
(other than US Treasury securities) and (2) prevailing wage and salary 
rates (the price of labor). Keeping these two types of prices within a 
publicly desirable range can have an enormous macroeconomic effect, 
both in terms of smoothing boom-and-bust cycles and in terms of ensuring 
a more sustainable and socially inclusive pattern of national development. 
In this section, we try to envision an OMO-like market-making and 
market-moving regime targeting each of these two prices—financial asset 
prices and labor prices—and to draw broad principles that could 
potentially inform these approaches.   
 
 
 125. See supra notes 90–93 and accompanying text. 
 126. For a discussion of the reasons why we generally allow public, as opposed to private, actors 
to move market prices, see supra notes 86–88 and accompanying text. 
 127. See Recursive Collective Action Problems, supra note 105. 
 128. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYSTEM, THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM: 
PURPOSES & FUNCTIONS 11 (2005), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pf/pdf/pf_complete. 
pdf. 
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1. Open Market Operations in Financial Assets: Why Not?  
Extending the FRBNY’s existing OMO mandate to cover market-
making in a wider variety of financial instruments seems a logical and 
operationally straightforward possibility. The FRBNY already runs a well-
oiled Treasury bond-trading machine: the Federal Open Market 
Committee (“FOMC”) periodically determines broad monetary-policy 
targets based on the macroeconomic data at its disposal, and the FRBNY 
staff devises and implements its trading strategy in line with these 
targets.129 In the wake of the latest crisis, the FRBNY also began 
conducting OMO in certain mortgage-backed securities (“MBS”).130 There 
seems to be no principled reason why the same FRBNY trading desk 
could not start purchasing and selling, pursuant to the same general 
principles, other financial instruments whose prices both significantly 
affect macroeconomic trends and are subject to dysfunctional, 
macroeconomically destabilizing cycle dynamics.  
What might these new Open Financial Asset Market Operations 
(“OFAMO”) look like? In parallel to its existing Treasury bond-trading, 
the FRBNY would establish a separate trading portfolio replicating the 
market portfolio. In effect, this would be an index fund reflecting the 
proportional values of all financial asset classes constituting the financial 
market as a whole.131 There is potentially a range of choices in 
constructing this portfolio. For example, it might be easier to start with 
making market in publicly-traded securities, in which case the prototype 
market portfolio could be a broad stock index, such as S&P 5000 or 
Wilshire 5000. However, this version of an OFAMO fund might leave 
systemically important asset classes out of the FRBNY’s market-moving 
reach. Thus, it is preferable to seek to replicate the entire market portfolio 
as closely as possible.132  
 
 
 129. See generally Permanent Open Market Operations, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/pomo_landing.html (last visited June 29, 2015).  
 130. Under its QE3 program, announced in September 2012, the Federal Reserve committed to 
purchase additional agency MBS at a pace of $40 billion per month, in order to maintain a stable 
secondary mortgage market. FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., DOMESTIC OPEN MARKET OPERATIONS 
DURING 2012 9 (2013), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/omo/omo2012.pdf. By the 
end of 2012, the FRBNY held a total of $1 trillion in face value of agency MBSs. Id.  
 131. The OFAMO portfolio could be constituted synthetically, rather than through the purchase of 
actual assets. This option would impose fewer upfront costs. In the case of a non-synthetic portfolio, 
however, the level of initial capitalization becomes particularly important, because the FRBNY’s 
market-moving capacity would ride on its relative market power.  
 132. The composition of the market portfolio can be estimated on the basis of a number of distinct 
databases and calculating methodologies. For a state-of-the-art treatment, see Ronald Doeswijk et al., 
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Once the OFAMO fund is established, the FOMC will conduct its 
current daily tracking of the nation’s financial markets not only pursuant 
to its macroprudential oversight mandate but also as part of its newly 
expanded market intervention mandate. If, for example, a particular asset 
class—such as MBS or technology stocks—rises in market value at rates 
suggestive of a bubble trend, the FOMC will instruct the FRBNY trading 
desk to short these securities, in order to put downward pressure on their 
prices.133 Conversely, the FOMC will instruct the FRBNY to go long on 
particular asset classes when they appear to be artificially undervalued. 
The same process would apply with respect to broader market price 
fluctuations. 
In essence, the OFAMO mechanism would function as a market-actor 
alternative and a complement to the currently evolving role of the Federal 
Reserve as a macroprudential regulator.134 There are important potential 
synergies between these two methods of bubble-and-bust preemption. The 
ongoing regulatory efforts to develop effective macroprudential risk 
metrics could be used to determine OFAMO trading strategy. By the same 
token, the market intelligence derived in the course of asset trading would 
inform the macroprudential regulators’ choices. 
This point bears particular emphasis in light of objections that we 
anticipate to the effect that there is no way to distinguish between bona 
fide asset price changes rooted in underlying “fundamentals,” on the one 
hand, and price changes that amount to “mere bubbles,” on the other.135 
 
 
The Global Multi-Asset Market Portfolio, 1959–2012, 70 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 26 (2014), available at 
http://www.cfapubs.org/doi/pdf/10.2469/faj.v70.n2.1. 
 133. Acting in this manner would tend to tighten the flow of speculative credit to the asset class in 
question, both because (a) speculative profit prospects would be diminished by the price drop and (b) 
the Federal Reserve’s engineering the drop would signal to the market its determination that current 
prices of the asset in question are artificially inflated and accordingly best suppressed. 
 134. For more on macroprudential regulatory policy, see generally BANK OF ENG., INSTRUMENTS 
OF MACROPRUDENTIAL POLICY: A DISCUSSION PAPER (2011), available at http://www.bankofengland. 
co.uk/publications/Documents/other/financialstability/discussionpaper111220.pdf; Bank for Int’l 
Settlements, Models and Tools for Macroprudential Analysis (Basel Comm. on Banking Superv., 
Working Paper No. 21, 2012), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs_wp21.pdf; FIN. STABILITY 
BD., OVERVIEW OF PROGRESS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE G20 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
STRENGTHENING FINANCIAL STABILITY: REPORT OF THE FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD TO G20 
LEADERS (2012), available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-content/uploads/r_120619a. 
pdf?page_moved=1; INT’L MONETARY FUND, POLICIES FOR MACROFINANCIAL STABILITY: HOW TO 
DEAL WITH CREDIT BOOMS (2012), available at www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2012/sdn1206.pdf; 
Paolo Angelini et al., Monetary and Macroprudential Policies (Macroprudential Research Network, 
Working Paper No. 1449, 2012), available at http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp1449. 
pdf.  
 135. Such arguments amount to claims that the “macroprudential turn” now underway among 
central bankers and financial regulators is an exercise in futility. For more on this “turn” and the new 
regulatory strategies that constitute it, see generally sources cited supra note 134. For a full synthesis 
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This familiar view, long associated with former Fed Chairman Alan 
Greenspan, used to prompt some to argue that central banks and other 
macroprudential regulators cannot effectively “lean,” ex ante, against the 
“winds” that blow bubbles, but must instead aim to “clean,” ex post, the 
mess left by bubbles after they have burst.136 While many authorities on 
central banking and financial regulation argued forcefully against the 
Greenspan position even before the most recent financial crisis, the crisis 
itself seems to have finally settled debate in favor of the “leaners,” whose 
view traces back to another distinguished past Chairman of the Federal 
Reserve, William McChesney Martin.137 It is now widely recognized 
among financial theorists, central bankers, and other macroprudential 
regulators (including now Greenspan himself) that certain proxies for 
fundamental value—e.g., building costs in the case of housing, or price-to-
equity ratios in the case of securities—can be used to identify potentially 
destabilizing, transitory price rises fueled mainly by excess credit 
availability.138 It is likewise now widely understood that sudden growth in 
credit aggregates can serve as an important indicator of unsustainable, 
leverage-driven price rises of the kind associated with bubbles.139 
 
 
of the issues involved, see Robert Hockett, The Macroprudential Turn: From Institutional ‘Safety and 
Soundness’ to Systematic ‘Financial Stability’ in Financial Supervision, 9 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 201 
(2015). For brief, summary treatment, see Robert Hockett, Leaning, Cleaning, and Macroprudence, 
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Mar. 27, 2013), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/ 
corpgov/2013/03/27/leaning-cleaning-and-macroprudence/. 
 136. Scott Hamilton, Greenspan Says He Would Pre-Empt Asset Bubbles Financed by Debt, 
BLOOMBERG BUS. (Dec. 4, 2014, 3:14 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-12-04/ 
greenspan-says-he-would-pre-empt-asset-bubbles-financed-by-debt (“Greenspan . . . argued in office 
that it was better to clean up after an asset bubble had burst rather than artificially prick it . . . .”).  
 137. For a sample of recent studies in this tradition, see ROBERT SHILLER, IRRATIONAL 
EXUBERANCE (3d ed., 2015); Claudio Borio & Philip Lowe, Asset Prices, Financial and Monetary 
Stability: Exploring the Nexus (Bank for Int’l Settlements, Working Paper No. 114, 2002), available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/work114.pdf; John Geanakoplos, Promises Promises (Cowles Found., 
Working Paper No. 1057, 2003); William R. White, Is Price Stability Enough? (Bank for Int’l 
Settlements, Working Paper No. 205, 2006), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/work205.pdf. For 
more on Martin—the one Chairman of the Federal Reserve to have served longer than Greenspan—
and his views, see ROBERT P. BREMNER, CHAIRMAN OF THE FED: WILLIAM MCCHESNEY MARTIN JR. 
AND THE CREATION OF THE MODERN AMERICAN FINANCIAL SYSTEM (2004).  
 138. See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 134–35; see also Janet Yellen, President & CEO, Fed. 
Reserve Bank of S.F., Presentation to the 18th Annual Hyman P. Minsky Conference on the State of 
the U.S. and World Economies—“Meeting the Challenges of the Financial Crisis”: A Minsky 
Meltdown: Lessons for Central Bankers (Apr. 16, 2009), available at http://www.frbsf.org/our-district/ 
press/presidents-speeches/yellen-speeches/2009/april/yellen-minsky-meltdown-central-bankers/. On 
Greenspan’s changed view, see Hamilton, supra note 136. On proxies for fundamental value, see 
SHILLER, supra note 137; ROBERT J. SHILLER, THE SUBPRIME SOLUTION: HOW TODAY’S GLOBAL 
FINANCIAL CRISIS HAPPENED, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2008); A Fixer-Upper for Finance, supra 
note 78. 
 139. See generally Geanakoplos, supra note 137; Hamilton, supra note 136. This view was first 
systematically articulated by the great early twentieth century economist Irving Fisher. See generally 
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It should also be noted that the task of distinguishing “artificial” asset 
price inflation or deflation from “fundamental” appreciation or 
depreciation is not qualitatively more difficult than what the FOMC 
already does and has long done in charting monetary policy. The latter 
task, after all, requires regularly estimating “natural” potential growth 
paths for the “real” economy and then targeting “appropriate” monetary 
aggregates accordingly—i.e., ensuring that an “artificial” value (that of 
currency in terms of goods and services) is in sync with a “fundamental” 
one (that of the goods and services themselves). In sum, our proposed 
OFAMO should be seen as a straightforward extension, a complement, 
and a fine-tuning of what already is done and has long been done by the 
Federal Reserve. 
2. Open Market Operations in the Labor Market: What If? 
While extending OMO to modulate price swings in financial assets 
would be a natural extension of the Federal Reserve’s current trading 
activities, applying the same logic of government action to modulating 
price swings in the national labor market raises very different, and 
potentially more difficult, operational issues. In contrast to financial 
instruments, one does not “buy and hold” or “sell” labor. Nevertheless, is 
it possible to imagine a system of functionally similar, macroeconomic 
stability-enhancing Open Labor Market Operations (“OLMO”) operating 
much like more traditional OMO?  
In theory, OLMO could stabilize labor markets by operating with 
respect to wage and salary rates under the same principles as OMO 
currently does with respect to interest rates. The federal government—
perhaps through the Department of Labor (“DOL”)—could commit to 
acting as an “employer of last resort” (“ELR”), as proposed by several 
economists since the 1950s.140 It would stand willing to hire, at or slightly 
below the current federal minimum wage,141 anyone laid off from a private 
sector job during an economic recession.142 As unemployment rates rose, 
 
 
IRVING FISHER, BOOMS AND DEPRESSIONS: SOME FIRST PRINCIPLES (1932). 
 140. See, e.g., L. RANDALL WRAY, UNDERSTANDING MODERN MONEY: THE KEY TO FULL 
EMPLOYMENT AND PRICE STABILITY 122–54 (1998); Pavlina R. Tcherneva, Permanent on-the-Spot 
Job Creation—The Missing Keynes Plan for Full Employment and Economic Transformation, 70 REV. 
SOC. ECON. 57, 76 (2012). See also HYMAN P. MINSKY, ENDING POVERTY: JOBS, NOT WELFARE 
(2013). 
 141. It might be advisable to keep the ELR wage slightly below the federal minimum prescribed 
for the private sector, in order to mitigate possible moral hazard concerns that we address below. 
 142. While this has obvious appeal as a matter of justice, its “countercyclical,” “automatic 
stabilizer” function is what is most relevant here. The National Bureau for Economic Research defines 
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the government would absorb excess labor, maintain consumer purchasing 
power, and thereby place a floor under the downward spiral. Once 
macroeconomic growth resumed, the government would shed labor 
through attrition as private-sector employers bid wages and benefits back 
up.143  
This type of ELR action resembles what we have called market-making 
activity. Just like a market-maker in securities, the government here offers 
wages at a “bid” price and “makes” a market for labor by standing ready to 
pay this price for qualifying labor.144 In addition, an ELR program would 
serve as a market-moving device in at least two respects. First, the bid 
price would effectively function as a labor price target rate, similar to the 
inflation target currently used in OMO. Second, the ELR program could 
offer benefits and establish workplace safety standards that would 
effectively function as benchmarks economy-wide.145  
It must be acknowledged, however, that certain practical and 
administrative difficulties would have to be addressed before any such 
program could be feasible. First is the question of eligibility. To ensure 
that the ELR program is functioning as an automatic stabilizer, it would be 
important to admit into the program only people able to show that they 
have held jobs prior to the economic downturn, to which their current 
unemployment is attributable.146 Second is the question of matching up 
eligible workers with tasks actually in need of being accomplished and to 
which they are suited.147 The program will have to include effective means 
 
 
an economic recession as a “significant decline in economic activity spread across the economy, 
lasting more than a few months, normally visible in real GDP, real income, employment, industrial 
production, and wholesale-retail sales.” US Business Cycle Expansions and Contractions, NAT’L 
BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, http://www.nber.org/cycles/cyclesmain.html (last visited June 30, 
2015). 
 143. In effect, the ELR program would operate similarly to federal price support programs for 
agricultural products or the Keynesian “buffer stock” program for commodities advocated in the late 
1940s. See Price Support, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usda/ usdahome? 
navid=PRICING_SUPPORT (last updated Sept. 25, 2012). For more on Keynes’s proposals for 
postwar commodity price stabilization by means of buffer stock maintenance, see Robert W. Dimand 
& Mary A. Dimand, J.M. Keynes on Buffer Stocks and Commodity Price Stabilization, 22 HIST. POL. 
ECON. 113 (1990), available at http://www.researchgate.net/publication/247814707_ J._M._Keynes_ 
on_Buffer_Stocks_and_Commodity_Price_Stabilization. See also WRAY, supra note 140, at 122–54; 
MINSKY, supra note 140.  
 144. See supra Part II.A. 
 145. In this capacity, the “market-moving” ELR program would function similarly to the FHA 
mortgage insurance standards, discussed above. See supra Part II.C. 
 146. Besides keeping the focus of the program on the stabilization function, this would offer the 
further advantage that beneficiaries would be known to be employable. 
 147. To ensure political support for this program, it must fulfill real needs for labor rather than 
“make work” artificially. See Thomas I. Palley, Government as Employer of Last Resort: Can it 
Work?, in INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS RESEARCH ASSOCIATION, 53RD ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS 269–74 
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of sorting along these lines. It would also be desirable for the program to 
include a training component, which would offer a collateral benefit—
greater employability of beneficiaries in the private sector. 
Third will be difficult questions concerning just where and by whom 
beneficiaries will be employed—not only in terms of physical locations, 
but also in terms of institutional affiliations. Will beneficiaries in 
Tennessee, for example, have to move to California for some positions, or 
will there be some means of ensuring that no one need move? Relatedly, 
will these beneficiaries all work within federal government agencies—e.g., 
some newly created government enterprise administered by DOL—or will 
the DOL operate as a sort of “temp service” broker farming out labor to 
states, municipalities, and/or private employers? The first option raises 
concerns about how quickly and efficiently the federal government could 
establish a new enterprise pursuing worthwhile projects dischargeable by 
mostly temporary labor. The second option avoids those concerns but 
raises new ones—e.g., the prospect of private firms’ laying off more of 
their own workers to capitalize on cheaper federally-supplied ones. This is 
a critical tradeoff that may not be possible to resolve in the abstract.  
A fourth question is whether beneficiaries would be treated as regular, 
albeit temporary, federal employees entitled to the same benefits as more 
permanent ones. If not, then some care will have to be taken in defining 
these beneficiaries’ status, in order to avoid stigmatization. A related 
question concerns moral hazard: will an ELR program induce or 
encourage complacency and poor work habits among beneficiaries? In 
theory, this risk could be addressed through a combination of (1) keeping 
the ELR wage and benefits package slightly less, or at the very least no 
more, attractive than the least attractive private-sector alternative,148 and 
(2) terminating the ELR employment of anyone who proves repeatedly 
problematic as an employee.149  
Finally, a fifth question concerns funding. Generally, this could be 
accomplished through garden-variety countercyclical financing, whereby 
the federal government discharges its slack-absorbing role during 
macroeconomic slumps through loose monetary and debt-financed fiscal 
 
 
(2001), available at http://www.thomaspalley.com/docs/articles/macro_policy/government_employer. 
pdf.  
 148. This might mean keeping the legislated federal minimum wage on the books, and keeping the 
ELR wage just below it. 
 149. “Problematic” might mean not turning up, making the workplace environment “hostile,” etc. 
Perhaps some type of “three strikes” rule would be in order. See WRAY, supra note 140, at 122–54. 
Implementing these controls, however, may create additional administrative complexities. 
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policy. Once private-sector growth is restored, excess money is mopped 
back up, while debt is retired via the restored tax revenues.150 
Ultimately, these types of issues may render OLMO too politically 
toxic and/or difficult to implement in practice. Yet, if it were feasible, 
OLMO could greatly increase the national economy’s resilience, stability, 
and long-term growth potential. Thus, it is worthwhile to have an open-
minded and detail-oriented discussion of its potential benefits and 
shortcomings. This Article, however, pursues a far more modest goal of 
illustrating how this kind of a program would fit into the broader universe 
of the government’s market-actor roles. 
B. Market-Levering: Financing National Infrastructure 
The transformative—market-levering, in the broadest sense—potential 
of the modern developmental finance state is especially evident in the 
realm of national infrastructure. 
1. Infrastructure as a Developmental Challenge 
It is no secret that America’s basic infrastructure—roads, bridges, 
tunnels, railways, airports, drinking water and waste water facilities, 
energy grids, and public schools and transportation—is outdated, worn, 
and generally unable to meet the country’s growing needs.151 Over the last 
decade, the American Society of Civil Engineers (“ASCE”) has 
consistently graded American transport, water, school, and other 
infrastructures with marks of “D+” or lower.152 Rebuilding this system is a 
necessary pre-condition for future increases in productivity, economic 
 
 
 150. Countercyclical stabilization policy in both its fiscal and monetary dimensions figures 
prominently in most macroeconomics textbooks. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN S. BLINDER, 
MACROECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES & POLICY 213–76 (12th ed. 2012).  
 151. See HEIDI CREBO-REDIKER & DOUGLAS REDIKER, FINANCING AMERICA’S 
INFRASTRUCTURE: PUTTING GLOBAL CAPITAL TO WORK (2008), available at http://www.voltairenet. 
org/IMG/pdf/Financing_America_Infrastructure.pdf; MICHAEL LIKOSKY, OBAMA’S BANK: FINANCING 
A DURABLE NEW DEAL (2010); OFFICE OF MANHATTAN BOROUGH PRESIDENT SCOTT M. STRINGER, 
BANKING ON THE FUTURE: A NEW PARADIGM FOR REBUILDING OUR NATION’S INFRASTRUCTURE 
(2011) [hereinafter STRINGER], available at http://www.baruch.cuny.edu/realestate/pdf/H7656_ 
BaruchBankingFutureWhtPaper.pdf.  
  152. See 2013 Report Card for America’s Infrastructure, AM. SOC’Y OF CIVIL ENG’RS, 
http://www.infrastructurereportcard.org/ (“D+”) (last visited June 30, 2015); 2009 Report Card for 
America’s Infrastructure, AM. SOC’Y OF CIVIL ENG’RS, http://www.infrastructurereportcard.org/2009/ 
sites/default/files/RC2009_exsummary.pdf (“D”) (last visited June 30, 2015); 2005 Report Card for 
America’s Infrastructure, AM. SOC’Y OF CIVIL ENG’RS, http://ascelibrary.org/doi/pdf/10.1061/ 
9780784478851 (“D”) (last visited June 30, 2015).  
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growth, stronger communities, and better quality of life. In that sense, it is 
a classic national-development project. 
It is also an expensive one. According to the ASCE’s estimates, the 
necessary improvements in infrastructure quality would require investment 
ranging from $1.6 to $3.6 trillion.153 Financing infrastructure projects 
tends to be a capital-intensive and risky activity. Not surprisingly, 
governments—be they state, local, or even national—often are too 
financially strapped to undertake significant infrastructure repair and 
expansion projects on their own.154 Private investors, on the other hand, 
often lack simple or straightforward means by which to channel their 
surplus capital toward infrastructure projects that promise returns 
compatible with their risk and liquidity preferences. Two main reasons, 
both of which will likely ring familiar to economists, are typically cited to 
explain the difficulty with attracting much-needed private capital 
investment in infrastructure projects. 
The first cited reason that private investment opportunity is limited is 
that public infrastructure generally either takes the form of a non-
excludable good (meaning that private parties are not able fully to recoup 
their investments via privately assessed user fees)155 or is better provided 
directly by governments or regulated monopolies than via competitive 
markets due to grid effects and/or increasing returns to scale.156 Thus, 
 
 
 153. See sources cited supra note 152. While the ASCE might not be altogether financially 
disinterested in the “grades” it assigns American infrastructure, its assessments appear to be widely 
endorsed or complemented by other assessments and reports. 
  154. See CREBO-REDIKER & REDIKER, supra note 151, at 9. 
  155. An example of a non-excludable good is an air traffic control system. It is neither the sort of 
thing that would be safe to have operating in parallel with other, competing systems, nor the sort of 
thing that could easily and safely exclude flyers who had not helped pay for that system, absent 
significant government involvement. Strictly speaking, a good is a “public” good only when it is both 
non-excludable and non-rivalrous, while rivalrous non-excludable goods—e.g., fish stocks, timber, 
commons areas—are separately classified as “common pool” resources. For present purposes it is non-
excludability that matters most. “Privately” assessed user fees refer to fees that would be levied by a 
private builder or owner of the infrastructure in question, then passed along in the form of dividends, 
capital gains, or interest payments to owners of and/or other investors in the private firm in question.  
 156. Where an industry requires large up-front costs of production, so that costs per unit of 
production steadily diminish as quantities produced increase, a single provider is, all else equal, more 
efficient than are multiple providers in aggregate. In this case, the industry in question is said to lend 
itself to “natural monopoly.” Closely related but analytically distinct is the phenomenon of a “grid” 
technology, such as a railroad, fiber-optic cable, or electrical powerline network, which typically not 
only involves high upfront costs and consequent increasing returns to scale, but also threatens 
excessive and congestive physical capacity—e.g., multiple competing parallel highways or 
powerlines—in the absence of monopoly. Formally, see William J. Baumol, On the Proper Cost Tests 
for Natural Monopoly in a Multiproduct Industry, 67 AM. ECON. REV. 809 (1977); see also WILLIAM 
J. BAUMOL ET AL., CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE (1982) 
(expounding a general theory of contestable markets). 
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dams, levees, power grids, roads, rail, bridges, systems of waste disposal, 
sewage and water supply, and many other utilities are all canonical public 
goods157 that are most efficiently supplied by a canonical natural 
monopoly, which means that some government instrumentality either will 
directly supply the system in question or will be closely bound up with 
whatever “private” provider receives the monopoly privilege.158  
The second reason that private capital is not able to channel sufficient 
funds to finance public infrastructure is the absence of deep secondary 
market capacity.159 State and local governments typically borrow large 
sums upfront to fund significant infrastructure projects—by issuing 
general or project-specific revenue bonds—and then use their tax revenues 
or user fees to repay ensuing debt obligations over time.160 However, this 
mode of finance raises a specific difficulty against the backdrop of our 
disaggregated and localized system of government: bond issuances by 
relatively small individual administrative units are inevitably small in 
comparison to competing investments like Treasury bonds or blue-chip 
corporate securities.161 Markets in such instruments tend to be thinner and 
less liquid than markets for competing investments, which discourages 
risk-averse private capital from flowing to them on optimally favorable 
terms.162  
Thus, there is a strong argument that the lack of an active secondary 
market keeps states’ and municipalities’ infrastructural borrowing costs 
needlessly high, as private investors demand risk and liquidity premia on 
their illiquid, thinly traded bonds. And so trillions of dollars of private 
(and even some public) capital which could finance localized public 
infrastructure—including pension fund, insurance company, mutual fund, 
sovereign wealth fund, and even foreign central bank capital—remain 
 
 
 157. For sources discussing the categories of public goods and market failure, see supra note 61.  
  158. Health insurance and other species of “social” insurance also fall into this category. See 
generally Robert Hockett, Making Sense of the Healthcare Reform Debate, 53 CHALLENGE 28 (2010) 
(showing that canonical forms of social insurance constitute natural monopolies best publicly provided 
or tightly regulated).  
 159. See CREBO-REDIKER & REDIKER, supra note 151, at 4.  
 160. See id. at 6; see also KPMG, INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT: BRIDGING THE GAP (2012), 
available at https://www.kpmg.com/Global/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/insight-magazine/ 
Documents/insight-investmentv3.pdf; SCOTT RAWLINS & JIM RAY, KPMG, FINDING A NEW WAY TO 
FUND HIGHWAY INFRASTRUCTURE (2014), https://home.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/pdf/2014/04/ 
foresight-22.pdf; L. Owen Kirkpatrick & Michael P. Smith, The Infrastructural Limits to Growth: 
Rethinking the Urban Growth Machine in Times of Fiscal Crisis, 35 INT’L J. URB. & REGIONAL RES. 
477 (2011). 
 161. See, e.g., CREBO-REDIKER & REDIKER, supra note 151, at 4. 
 162. See id.  
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under- or untapped.163 In this sense, the market for large-scale institutional 
investments in American infrastructure represents an incipient or 
incomplete market that could potentially be “levered” into doing much 
more. Indeed, the situation is strikingly reminiscent of what we described 
earlier in connection with national mortgage markets prior to the New 
Deal.164 
This analogy has not been lost on policy-makers. In recent years, there 
have been several attempts to propose reforms of public infrastructure 
finance in the United States.165 While differing in specific details, these 
proposals generally seek to institute a new federal instrumentality—
sometimes labeled a National Infrastructure Bank (“NIB”)—charged with 
facilitating public infrastructure finance, mainly through some 
combination of direct federal grants, loan guarantees, and insurance.166 
Building on some of the existing proposals, however, it is possible to 
envisage an NIB that goes beyond these familiar methods and performs 
the government’s role as a market actor in a more explicit and proactive 
way. 
2. Basic Proposal: National Infrastructure Bank 
In its basic form, an NIB would seek to amplify and optimize the 
currently sub-optimal system of public-private cooperation in the area of 
 
 
 163. See sources cited supra note 160. The availability of this capital is made evident by both the 
contents and the very existence of cheerful Wiley Publishing Company investor titles including NEIL 
S. GRIGG, INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCE: THE BUSINESS OF INFRASTRUCTURE FOR A SUSTAINABLE 
FUTURE (2010); MICHAEL D. UNDERHILL, THE HANDBOOK OF INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTING (2010); 
and BARBARA WEBER & HANS WILHELM ALFEN, INFRASTRUCTURE AS AN ASSET CLASS: 
INVESTMENT STRATEGIES, PROJECT FINANCE, AND PPP (2010). The existence of these investor-
catering books is not the sole testament to the hunger of private investors for infrastructure 
investments. See KPMG, supra note 160; RAWLINS & RAY, supra note 160; Greg Roumeliotis & Mike 
Stone, Exclusive: Infrastructure Investors Line Up for Indiana Toll Road, REUTERS (Oct. 15, 2014, 
4:48 AM), http://in.reuters.com/article/2014/10/14/us-indianatollroad-m-a-idINKCN0I32T720141014. 
 164. See supra Part II.A. 
 165. See, e.g., Nation Building Here at Home Act of 2012, H.R. 4352, 112th Cong. (2012), 
available at https://www.congress.gov/112/bills/hr4352/BILLS-112hr4352ih.pdf; National Infrastructure 
Bank Act of 2007, S. 1926, 110th Cong. (2007), available at https://www.congress.gov/110/bills/ 
s1926/BILLS-110s1926is.pdf; National Infrastructure Bank Act of 2007, H.R. 3401, 110th Cong. 
(2007), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-110hr3401ih/pdf/BILLS-110hr3401ih.pdf; 
National Infrastructure Development Act of 2007, H.R. 3896, 110th Cong. (2007), available at 
https://www.congress.gov/110/bills/hr3896/BILLS-110hr3896ih.pdf; Fiscal Year 2016 Budget 
Overview, OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/overview (last visited July 
5, 2015); Joseph Weber, Obama to Propose $50B in Infrastructure Projects, WASH. TIMES (Sept. 6, 
2010), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/sep/6/obama-propose-50b-infrastructure-projects/. 
 166. See sources cited supra note 165; see also EDWARD D. KLEINBARD, WE ARE BETTER THAN 
THIS: HOW GOVERNMENT SHOULD SPEND OUR MONEY 287–89 (2015) (discussing the idea of an 
NIB). 
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infrastructure finance. In terms of our taxonomy, NIB operations would 
most immediately fit within the market-levering category.167 From that 
perspective, an NIB can be viewed as an infrastructure-specific analogue 
to the home finance GSEs, as well as to various other forms of “public-
private partnership” (“P3”).168  
The GSE experience is particularly instructive here because of the 
strikingly similar nature of the problems currently plaguing the US market 
for infrastructure finance and those that plagued US home loan markets 
before the creation of Fannie Mae.169 As discussed earlier, pre-New Deal 
mortgage markets were localized, small-scale, and illiquid, which raised 
borrowing costs for homebuyers and prevented the emergence of a well-
functioning national market for mortgage finance.170 Fannie Mae remedied 
these inefficiencies by making a secondary market in FHA-standardized 
mortgage instruments and thereby lowering both private lenders’ risks and 
borrowers’ costs.171 Moreover, by creating a nation-wide market and 
leaning upon the full faith and credit of the United States as a backstop, 
Fannie Mae was able to pool and ensure risk on a much larger scale than 
could any primary lender-bank at the time.  
 
 
 167. Proponents of infrastructure banks sometimes refer explicitly to these institutions’ capacity to 
“leverage” private capital. See, e.g., STRINGER, supra note 151, at 1 (advocating “using small amounts 
of government money to leverage substantial sums of private sector money to achieve important social 
objectives”). 
 168. In today’s discourse, the term “public-private partnership”—P3 or PPP—refers to a broad 
universe of diverse and context-specific arrangements. For summaries and assessments of recent P3 
arrangements in Europe and elsewhere, see JEFFREY DELMON, PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP 
PROJECTS IN INFRASTRUCTURE: AN ESSENTIAL GUIDE FOR POLICY MAKERS (2011); EDUARDO ENGEL 
ET AL., THE ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS: A BASIC GUIDE (2014); DARRIN 
GRIMSEY & MERVYN K. LEWIS, PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS: THE WORLDWIDE REVOLUTION IN 
INFRASTRUCTURE PROVISION AND PROJECT FINANCE (2004); LIKOSKY, supra note 151; E. R. 
YESCOMBE, PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS: PRINCIPLES OF POLICY AND FINANCE (2007). In the 
United States, P3 models for infrastructure financing are used mainly by individual states and 
municipalities. See, e.g., GEORGE CAROLLO ET AL., PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS FOR 
INFRASTRUCTURE DELIVERY (2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=2149313; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-728, WASTEWATER INFRASTRUCTURE 
FINANCING: STAKEHOLDER VIEWS ON A NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE BANK AND PUBLIC-PRIVATE 
PARTNERSHIPS (2010), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/310/306947.pdf. The nature and policy 
impact of individual P3s differ greatly. Many P3 infrastructure projects involve little more than 
government outsourcing of various project-related functions to private parties, which raises familiar 
problems. P3s may also involve loan guarantees and/or direct public financing alongside private 
lenders. While cognizant of this variety, for purposes of this Article, we focus specifically on 
mechanisms explicitly operating via the government-as-market-actor modality.  
 169. See CREBO-REDIKER & REDIKER, supra note 151, at 9–10 (making a similar GSE analogy). 
Their policy recommendations directly build upon the Fannie Mae model, as it would apply to 
infrastructure finance. Our version of an NIB as a market-levering government actor incorporates 
many of their insights. 
 170. See supra Part II.A. 
 171. See supra Part II.A. 
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This experience suggests that today’s fragmented and illiquid market 
for infrastructure finance needs an institution—a large public 
instrumentality—that would pool municipal bonds and their associated 
default and liquidity risks.172 Like the early Fannie Mae, an NIB would be 
initially capitalized by the federal government.173 State or municipal 
contributions might also, but need not, be required or solicited. To 
leverage public money, the NIB would issue bonds (or some mix of debt 
and equity) and commit to pay out returns associated with particular 
issuances on the strength of (1) user fees and dedicated revenues that could 
feasibly be levied for the purpose; (2) dedicated pools of collateral, in the 
manner of the European-style covered bonds; and (3) the ultimate full faith 
and credit of the United States.174  
The federal government’s “full faith and credit” backup is a 
particularly potent factor in this respect. Explicitly backed by the US 
government, the NIB is likely to be a much larger and more powerful 
market actor than any private municipal-bond-pooling entity, in the same 
way as Fannie Mae has always dwarfed all non-federal competitors in the 
secondary home mortgage markets. It is reasonable to expect that NIB 
bonds will attract great interest from large institutional investors—pension 
funds, investment companies, investment banks, foreign central banks, and 
sovereign wealth funds—who would view these bonds as close substitutes 
for US Treasury bonds and agency securities issued by the GSEs.  
It is hard to over-estimate the significance of this factor, not only for 
purposes of financing infrastructure projects but, importantly, from the 
perspective of systemic financial stability. Large, globally active 
institutional investors seem to be constantly searching for instruments that 
are nearly as low-risk as US Treasury bonds but offer higher returns.175 
 
 
 172. See CREBO-REDIKER & REDIKER, supra note 151, at 8; see also sources cited supra note 165.  
  173. All of the current proposals require initial congressional capitalization of an NIB-type entity, 
although the precise levels of such proposed capitalization vary. See CREBO-REDIKER & REDIKER, 
supra note 151, at 2. Current proposals generally do not require state or municipal capital 
contributions.  
 174. See proposals cited supra note 165. “Covered bonds” are a form of collateralized bond 
instrument, similar to US asset-backed securities, except that the collateral in question is typically 
guaranteed by a government entity. First developed in Prussia and Denmark during the late 18th 
century and reminiscent of first US Treasury Secretary Hamilton’s “sinking fund” model of public 
finance, covered bonds have become increasingly popular in Europe over the past several decades as 
modes of public finance. See generally EUR. COVERED BOND COUNCIL, 2015 ECBC EUR. COVERED 
BOND FACT BOOK (2015), available at http://ecbc.hypo.org/Content/Default.asp?PageID=501 
(providing a comprehensive overview of covered bonds as an asset class). 
 175. See, e.g., Ben S. Bernanke et al., International Capital Flows and the Returns to Safe Assets 
in the United States, 2003-2007 (Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., International Finance 
Discussion Paper No. 1014, 2011), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/ifdp/2011/1014/ 
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This search for yield creates potentially destabilizing demand for complex 
financial instruments structured to generate high returns, while hiding the 
true extent of underlying risk.176 Creating a brand new asset class that 
serves as a legitimately “safe” alternative to US Treasury bonds, while 
offering a potentially higher yield, would allow the channeling of this 
demand away from the riskier and more speculative assets.177 To enhance 
the appeal of this new asset class to institutional investors, it would be 
desirable to grant NIB bonds the same regulatory and discount window 
treatment as US Treasury bonds, agency securities, and some forms of 
commercial paper currently receive under the applicable risk-based capital 
adequacy and the Federal Reserve’s discounting regimes, respectively.178  
The NIB would use the funds raised through its bond issuances to 
purchase and pool revenue bonds and project bonds issued by 
municipalities, public utilities, and other government instrumentalities 
seeking financing to fund infrastructure projects.179 It is important that the 
NIB impose certain eligibility criteria on prospective securities, in order to 
ensure commercial viability of the model. If the NIB adheres strictly to 
these criteria, it would help to ensure continuously high demand for NIB 
bonds from large institutional investors.180 
 
 
ifdp1014.pdf (examining the effects of the growing demand from foreign investors for US government 
debt); Arvind Krishnamurthy & Annette Vissing-Jorgensen, The Aggregate Demand for Treasury 
Debt (2010), available at http://www.treasury.gov/about/organizational-structure/ offices/RoundTable/ 
2011%20session%204%20vissing_tsy%20demand%20PAPER.pdf (documenting investors’ preferences 
for US Treasury bonds); Zoltan Pozsar, Institutional Cash Pools and the Triffin Dilemma of the U.S. 
Banking System (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 11/190, 2011), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2011/wp11190.pdf (analyzing the dynamics and implications 
of investor demand for safe, high-quality assets). 
 176. See sources cited supra note 175. This search for yield fueled the junk-bond craze of the 
1980s, interest in loan participations during the 1990s, and the mortgage-backed securities bubble in 
the early to mid-2000s. During that last episode, high-risk MBSs and related products were structured 
specifically to get the highest credit ratings indicating their supposedly “riskless” status, while paying 
interest at rates higher than US government bonds.  
 177. For more on the desirability of creating such assets, see Pozsar, supra note 175, at 21–24. 
 178. The Federal Reserve’s discounting regime, pursuant to which the central bank “monetizes” 
certain eligible forms of commercial paper, is embodied at 12 U.S.C. § 372 (2014). The FDIC-
administered capital-regulatory regime, pursuant to which some forms of safe and/or favored assets are 
risk-weighted at less than 100%, is embodied at 12 C.F.R. pt. 325 (2015). 
 179. See sources cited supra note 165. 
 180. Advocates of current NIB proposals point out that the European Investment Bank (“EIB”) 
operates much in the manner described above and attracts plentiful private capital to fund European 
infrastructure projects. The EIB was established in 1958 and is owned and operated by the EU 
member-states. Its mission is to foster, through a variety of public-private investment partnerships, the 
continued infrastructural development and economic integration of the European Union. For more, see 
EUR. INV. BANK, http://www.eib.org/ (last visited July 6, 2015). The EIB has proved quite effective in 
tapping the global capital markets, selling its bonds to the same pension funds, sovereign wealth funds, 
and other financial intermediaries that routinely buy US Treasury bonds and other global “blue-chip” 
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In the future, the NIB might develop the capacity not only to pool 
municipal and other public utility bonds as a secondary purchaser but also 
to originate infrastructure loans for particular projects. For instance, it 
might start by extending loans to federal agencies charged with 
infrastructure-provision—e.g., the Federal Highway Administration—and 
then add direct lending to states or municipalities in need of further 
infrastructure funding. Although current proposals do not articulate this 
goal, it may be desirable to require the NIB to target and prioritize projects 
that have some national socio-economic significance. Developing its 
capacities along these lines, the NIB might ultimately become a full-
service project- and infrastructure-finance institution. 
The NIB we describe above would be a classic market-making and 
market-levering actor, along the lines of the original Fannie Mae model. 
This basic version of an NIB is not entirely novel: it explicitly 
incorporates many elements of existing policy proposals. Perhaps more 
importantly, this basic version of an NIB remains fundamentally grounded 
in the familiar justifications and macroeconomic categories of public 
goods, market failure, and market incompleteness. This frame of 
reference, however, may be too narrow, and confining the debate to its 
conceptual limits may prevent the emergence of a more ambitious and 
normatively compelling version of an NIB as a principal vehicle through 
which to pursue a continuous and sustainable national development 
strategy. Moving beyond the limits of the current debate on infrastructure 
finance, we can start outlining the general contours of this new and more 
ambitious version of an NIB. 
3. Advanced Proposal: National Capital Management Corporation 
An NIB based on our understanding should be seen as a permanent 
instrumentality that proactively facilitates and promotes not only the 
restoration or extension of currently inadequate physical infrastructure but 
also more transformative projects aimed at “leapfrogging” America along 
a progressive developmental trajectory. We envision an NIB providing 
infrastructure that leads or revolutionizes markets, in ways that the polity 
deems desirable, rather than merely follows existing markets’ immediate 
dictates. For example, a proactive NIB might not merely seek to ensure 
 
 
securities—while steering clear of US municipal bonds. See CREBO-REDIKER & REDIKER, supra note 
151, at 4–5. 
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that petroleum is available nationwide but could act systematically to 
convert our energy system from petro- to hydrogen-based.181  
An NIB reconceived along these lines would require a different 
approach to structuring and financing its activities than the GSE-inspired 
models entail. Because its mission is potentially more ambitious, it should 
not rely entirely on debt financing but should tap into additional sources of 
funding—mezzanine and even equity capital.182 This strategy would serve, 
in part, to attract more capital and, in part, to attract more ambitious, less 
risk-averse capital of the sort that typically comes from equity investors. 
How might this be done?  
In our model, this next-generation infrastructure-development entity—
which we call the National Capital Management Corporation (“NCMC” 
or, perhaps, “Nicky Mac”)—would operate very much like an investment 
management company sponsoring and running one or more private equity 
funds.183 Some of these funds would be set up to invest in individual 
infrastructure projects, while others would hold broader portfolios of 
projects with particular risk-return profiles sought by the target investors. 
In direct parallel to private equity (“PE”) firms, NCMC would act as the 
sponsor and general partner of each individual fund it sets up. In its 
capacity as the fund’s general partner, NCMC would contribute some 
capital of its own, but the majority of the fund’s capital would come from 
private investors that become passive limited partners in the same fund. 
NCMC would manage the resultant pool of assets much as any private 
fund manager would do, assembling a portfolio of promising investment 
projects which, while involving some risk of not panning out in some 
cases, would be sufficiently diversified as substantially to lay-off 
appreciable quanta of risk.184 Individual investments in the fund’s portfolio 
 
 
 181. Something similar is behind the 2008 Clean Energy Bank proposals of Senators Bingaman 
and Domenici and Representatives Inslee and Israel. See 21st Century Energy Technology 
Deployment Act, H.R. 2212, 111th Cong. (2009), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-
111hr2212ih/pdf/BILLS-111hr2212ih.pdf; 21st Century Energy Technology Deployment Act, S. 
3233, 110th Cong. (2008), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-110s3233is/pdf/BILLS-
110s3233is.pdf; Clean Energy Investment Bank Act of 2008, S. 2730, 110th Cong. (2008), available 
at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-110s2730is/pdf/BILLS-110s2730is.pdf. 
  182.  Others have argued that, in order to finance large-scale infrastructure projects, traditional 
forms of debt must be supplemented with other capital instruments. See, e.g., KPMG, supra note 160, 
at 10–11. “Mezzanine capital” refers, generally, to preferred stock, subordinated debt, and other hybrid 
instruments combining the elements of both debt and equity.  
  183.  For more on private equity funds in general, see EILEEN APPELBAUM & ROSEMARY BATT, 
PRIVATE EQUITY AT WORK: WHEN WALL STREET MANAGES MAIN STREET (2014); HARRY 
CENDROWSKI ET AL., PRIVATE EQUITY: HISTORY, GOVERNANCE, AND OPERATIONS (2d ed. 2012).  
 184. See supra note 180. As mentioned earlier, some of the NCMC funds may be set up and 
marketed as single-project investment vehicles. The composition of each fund’s assets, its investment 
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may be structured in various ways, depending on the nature of selected 
projects and NCMC’s managerial judgment. As with many private funds, 
NCMC would require that limited partners agree to lock up all or some 
part of their investment dollars with the fund for some set minimum period 
of time.185  
The compensation and profit-sharing structure of the NCMC funds 
would also track the traditional PE model.186 Like any fund manager, 
NCMC would charge an annual management fee and a contingent 
performance fee—“carried interest,” or “carry.”187 To enhance the 
attractiveness of the NCMC funds as a new asset class, however, it might 
be desirable to offer some additional incentives to private investors. The 
US government backup is a particularly strong potential sweetener in this 
respect. Thus, the government could potentially guarantee the return of all 
or a substantial part of private investors’ principal upon the expiration of a 
specified lock-up period. The government could also guarantee a certain 
minimum rate of return on private parties’ investments—either for the 
duration of the lock-up period, for some shorter period of time, or even for 
as long as the investor keeps its interest in the fund.  
Furthermore, in some cases the profit-sharing component could 
potentially be structured in layers. For example, the NCMC, in its capacity 
as the manager of a particular fund, could relinquish all carry due to it on 
the first tier of the fund’s net profits. Carry charged on profits above that 
threshold could also vary, gradually increasing to 20%. If the fund’s 
profits exceed some relatively high threshold, however, it may be 
desirable to increase the NCMC’s carry to capture all of such top-tier 
super-gains. In effect, this model would present private investors with new 
investment opportunities that would (1) replicate bonds in their guarantee 
of principal and possibly some modest rate of return, (2) then offer carry-
free equity bands, essentially entitling them to all net profits, and (3) then 
offer one or more traditional PE-like equity bands entitling them to 
 
 
strategy, and its profit-sharing and fee structure would ultimately depend on the economics of the 
underlying projects and the risk appetites of the targeted private investors. The NCMC would, in 
effect, tailor its products to reflect both the public’s needs and the private investors’ preferences. 
 185. See sources cited supra note 183. 
 186. For an overview of compensation arrangements in PE firms, see CENDRWOSKI ET AL., supra 
note 183. 
 187. Typically, the management fee equals 2% of (private) assets under management, while carry 
equals 20% of the fund’s net profits. See, e.g., Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership 
Profits in Private Equity Funds, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 1 (2008). 
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predetermined percentages of net profits, possibly capped by specified 
ceilings.188  
Of course, offering these risk-minimizing benefits might not be 
necessary with respect to each individual NCMC fund, especially where 
the fund invests in projects with strong revenue-generating potential 
and/or targets investors with high risk tolerance. The NCMC should not 
simply socialize the risk of infrastructure investments while generating 
gratuitous windfalls for its private partners. At the same time, however, 
additional government guarantees and profit-sharing benefits could be 
effective in attracting certain types of relatively risk-averse capital or 
funding certain types of projects. Our brief outline of potentially useful 
asset enhancement techniques is merely suggestive, as each individual 
NCMC fund’s risk- and profit-sharing structure would need to be 
determined on a case-by-case basis.  
The key point is that, if properly structured and priced, NCMC funds 
should be an attractive new asset class available to current private equity 
and hedge fund investors, as well as to broader swaths of large 
institutional investors searching for yield.189 As noted earlier, it is difficult 
to over-estimate the significance of creating this new asset class for 
protecting systemic financial stability: by channeling the flow of yield-
hungry capital away from complex, high-risk financial instruments, it 
would help to minimize the danger of another financial market bubble.190 
The sources of the returns generated by the NCMC-managed funds 
would vary depending on the specific projects in which they invest.191 
However, it is also important not to overlook the fact that infrastructural 
optimization would enable the federal government to reap the full benefits 
of scale economies and recapture positive externalities associated with the 
nation-wide provision of public goods.192 These gains would bolster the 
government’s ability to offer or guarantee stipulated returns to private 
investors in NCMC funds. This is particularly true in light of the potential 
 
 
 188. The viability of such a tiered profit-sharing model and its precise structure would have to be 
determined through financial cost-benefit analysis, taking into account all relevant considerations. 
 189. For a discussion of the importance of this factor, see sources cited supra notes 176–78 and 
accompanying text.  
 190. Id. 
 191. For example, a project of intercity light rail construction or a network of hydrogen- or 
electrically-powered vehicle refueling or recharging stations could generate returns through user fees 
or targeted taxes. 
 192. See KLEINBARD, supra note 166, at 283–85 (discussing substantial productivity returns to 
public investments in infrastructure). 
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positive effects of the NCMC-financed infrastructure projects on 
employment and, hence, income tax revenues.193  
Structuring and operating the NCMC along these lines would 
potentially broaden the range of projects it can undertake and, more 
generally, enhance its capacity to act in a truly entrepreneurial, forward-
looking manner, as befits a PE-like market actor—but with an explicit 
view to important socially beneficial ends, as befits a public market 
actor.194 Again, for example, if a national consensus were to emerge that a 
massive shift to hydrogen- or electrically-powered automobiles would be 
desirable in the long run, but the near-term private establishment of broad 
networks of hydrogen or electrical refueling stations is stymied by familiar 
collective action problems, NCMC would be well-positioned to take the 
lead in effecting the needed change. The same logic could apply to a much 
broader range of development-oriented strategic decisions. For instance, 
were we to decide as a society that the current global distribution of 
Ricardian comparative advantage operates to the unnecessary 
disadvantage of our manufacturing capacity, NCMC could lead a 
concerted effort to rectify the resulting structural imbalances, in part by 
channeling funds into new technology or other innovative ventures.195 In 
effect, the NCMC model would merge our vision of a developmental 
finance state with what other social scientists have termed a 
“developmental network state”—an evolving institutionalized pattern of 
 
 
 193. Even very conservative macroeconomic models indicate that the positive employment, GDP-
growth, and consequent income tax revenue increases generated by significant infrastructure 
investment would largely, if not wholly, offset project costs in the current low interest-rate 
environment. See Robert C. Hockett & Robert H. Frank, Public Infrastructure Investment, Renewed 
Economic Growth, and the U.S. Fiscal Position 17 (Cornell Law Sch., Legal Studies Research Paper 
No. 12-04, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1987656; Robert C. 
Hockett, White Paper in Support of the Nation Building Here at Home Act of 2012 15 (Cornell Law 
Sch., Legal Studies Research Paper No. 12-10, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2029239. 
 194. By putting the NCMC team in charge of managing the public-private capital, our proposed 
model effectively reverses the familiar P3 pattern, in which private actors manage the money and 
make investment decisions. Placing a public actor in charge of managing infrastructure investments 
would also help to avoid the well-known and widely-criticized P3 dynamic, whereby the government 
bears disproportionately high implicit costs of financing certain projects by virtue of redirecting large 
future revenue streams to private partners. See KLEINBARD, supra note 166, at 287. 
 195. For instance, if cheaper foreign labor is what drives manufacturing capacity overseas, the 
United States might use NCMC to subsidize the wholesale adoption of robotic and 3D-printing 
technologies throughout the economy, while requiring recipient firms to issue new shares in 
themselves to the citizenry in return. For more on Ricardian comparative advantage and associated 
premises that figure into orthodox trade theory, see, e.g., ANDREA MANESCHI, COMPARATIVE 
ADVANTAGE IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 10–18 (1998). The locus 
classicus is DAVID RICARDO, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION (Prometheus 
Books 1996) (1817). 
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government intervention aimed at resolving network failures that hinder 
commercialization of technological and scientific advances.196 
From this perspective, one might imagine numerous possibilities for a 
more seamlessly integrated developmental strategy.197 Undoubtedly, 
identifying and operationalizing potential synergies is a complex task that 
raises various economic, legal, and organizational issues.198 Our present 
goal is merely to suggest some possibilities for building a proactive, 
entrepreneurial, and development-oriented national infrastructure-
financing body. As discussed above, the operations of this new public 
actor—both in its basic NIB version and in its more advanced NCMC 
version—represent a direct expansion of the government’s market-
levering function. However, it could also play significant market-making, 
market-moving, and market-backstopping roles. The NCMC model is 
particularly likely to act as a market-maker, by actively inducing 
infrastructural change that would not otherwise happen and thus creating 
new markets for financial instruments. Both the NIB and NCMC models 
could also perform the market-moving and market-backstopping 
functions. For example, if there were signs that demand for state or local 
infrastructure-related bonds was becoming either too overheated or too 
lackluster, making local borrowing either too easy or too expensive, an 
NIB/NCMC could modulate the price swings through open market 
operations. Alternatively, if the value of infrastructure bonds suddenly 
plummeted as a result of a broader market panic, an NIB/NCMC might 
stabilize these markets by temporarily acting as a “buyer of last resort.” 
 
 
 196. For discussions of this phenomenon, see SEÁN Ó RIAIN, THE POLITICS OF HIGH-TECH 
GROWTH: DEVELOPMENTAL NETWORK STATES IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 5 (2004) (drawing a 
conceptual distinction between a “developmental network state” and a “developmental bureaucratic 
state”); Block, supra note 7, at 172; Matthew R. Keller & Fred Block, Explaining the Transformation 
in the US Innovation System: The Impact of a Small Government Program, 11 SOCIO-ECONOMIC REV. 
629, 650 (2012). 
 197. For instance, it might be possible to integrate the proposed NCMC with the existing Small 
Business Administration (“SBA”), established in 1953, to facilitate small business formation and 
growth via the so-called “three Cs” of capital, contracting, and counseling. See About the SBA, U.S. 
SMALL BUS. ADMIN., https://www.sba.gov/category/navigation-structure/about-sba (last visited July 1, 
2015). This combined federal instrumentality—which we tentatively call a National Investment 
Authority (“NIA”)—would facilitate integration of both infrastructure and SBA “start-up” funding 
policy and programs into a more comprehensive and coherent national development strategy. We plan 
to examine this institutional possibility in a separate project. 
 198. Generally, the degree of practical feasibility and potential efficacy of the proposed NCMC 
structure would ultimately depend on numerous factors we did not discuss in detail here: how the 
NCMC is set up and integrated within the federal government’s structure, what substantive and 
procedural rules apply to its operations, how exactly the relationship between NCMC and private 
investors in its funds is governed, and so on. These questions, however, are properly a subject of a 
separate research project. 
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The government’s market-backstopping—or market-preserving—
function, however, presents a separate set of problems, for which a 
separate solution may be necessary. The next section discusses one such 
potential solution. 
C. Market-Preserving: Reinventing the “Golden Share” Mechanism 
As discussed above, one of the federal government’s critical functions 
is what we call market-preserving. Typical examples of this function 
include temporary, emergency-driven injections of liquidity in private 
markets as a last-resort mechanism for preventing such markets’ imminent 
collapse.199 Sometimes, however, market-preserving efforts go beyond the 
traditional lender or market-maker of last resort operations and involve 
direct capital injections into private firms whose failure is considered too 
potentially costly or destabilizing for the market.200 In this capacity, the 
government acts as an “investor of last resort.”201 These extraordinary 
actions are inevitably controversial and politicized, as they make explicit 
the reallocation of risk and loss from specific private parties to the 
taxpaying public in general.202 Bailouts are often seen as a public act of 
socializing losses from socially detrimental market activities that 
generated significant private gains for those who recklessly pursued them. 
1. Bailouts, Banks, and the Public Interest 
During the global financial crisis of 2008, this familiar scenario was 
replayed on a new scale. To prevent unravelling of the complex global 
network of interconnected financial markets in the fall of 2008, the US 
government embarked on a wide-ranging program of liquidity provision 
and capital support for privately-owned financial institutions.203 As a 
result, the US Treasury became a self-professed “reluctant shareholder”—
often a controlling one—in several private companies, including American 
 
 
 199. See supra Part II.D. 
 200. See, e.g., William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 943 (2009) 
(detailing the dynamics of the federal bailout of American International Group). 
 201. See Jeffrey Manns, Building Better Bailouts: The Case for a Long-Term Investment 
Approach, 63 FLA. L. REV. 1349, 1383–97 (2011) (arguing for the need to institutionalize the federal 
government’s role as an “investor of last resort”). 
 202. For an insightful discussion of this phenomenon, see Anna Gelpern, Financial Crisis 
Containment, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1051, 1071–76 (2009). 
 203. See supra notes 62–67 and accompanying text. 
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International Group (AIG), Citigroup, and General Motors.204 From the 
outset, the Administration was eager to assure the American public that it 
did not intend to interfere in the management of the rescued companies 
and planned to dispose of the shares as soon as possible.205 By the end of 
2014, Treasury had exited most of its TARP equity investments.206  
Exiting TARP investments, however, did not end the controversy 
around the federal government’s bailout strategy. Most commentators 
criticized the federal government for negotiating individual deals with 
troubled firms on an ad hoc basis, which led to inconsistencies and a lack 
of transparency in the process and often made bailout terms economically 
sub-optimal from taxpayers’ perspective.207 The Great Bailout of 2008 is 
often characterized as an ultimate political victory for “too big to fail” 
financial institutions, which institutionalized their immunity from market 
discipline.208 The federal government’s emergency acquisition of 
controlling ownership stakes in private firms also raised difficult doctrinal 
and practical questions under US corporate laws ill-equipped to deal with 
the sovereign shareholder.209 In this connection, some scholars’ principal 
concern is with protecting minority shareholders’ rights vis-à-vis the 
government, while others call for a more assertive exercise by the 
government of its shareholder rights in order to protect American 
taxpayers’ interests.210  
 
 
 204. See OFFICE OF FIN. STABILITY, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, AGENCY FINANCIAL REPORT: 
FISCAL YEAR 2009 42 (2009), available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/ 
reports/Documents/OFS%20AFR%2009.pdf.  
 205. Id. 
 206. See OFFICE OF FIN. STABILITY, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, AGENCY FINANCIAL REPORT: 
FISCAL YEAR 2014 vii–ix, 12–13 (2014) available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-
stability/reports/Documents/FY2014%20OFS%20AFR%20FINAL%20-%20Nov%206%202014.pdf. 
According to the Treasury’s report, by the end of 2014, the government had fully disposed of its stakes 
in AIG, Citigroup, and GM, among others. Id. 
 207. See, e.g., Barbara Black, The U.S. as “Reluctant Shareholder”: Government, Business and 
the Law, 5 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 561, 593 (2010); Lissa L. Broome, Government Investment in 
Banks: Creeping Nationalization or Prudent, Temporary Aid?, 4 FLA. INT’L U. L. REV. 409 (2009); 
Steven M. Davidoff & David Zaring, Regulation by Deal: The Government’s Response to the 
Financial Crisis, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 463 (2009). 
 208. See, e.g., SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER 
AND THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN (2010); DAVID SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: 
UNDERSTANDING THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND ITS (UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES (2011).  
 209. For insightful discussions of such doctrinal and practical difficutlies, see Steven M. Davidoff, 
Uncomfortable Embrace: Federal Corporate Ownership in the Midst of the Financial Crisis, 95 
MINN. L. REV. 1733 (2011); Steven Davidoff Solomon & David Zaring, After the Deal: Fannie, 
Freddie, and the Financial Crisis Aftermath, 95 B.U. L. REV. 371 (2015); Marcel Kahan & Edward 
Rock, When the Government Is the Controlling Shareholder: Implications for Delaware, 35 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 409 (2010). 
 210. For analyses of government ownership from the shareholder perspective, see Marcel Kahan 
& Edward B. Rock, When the Government is the Controlling Shareholder, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1293 
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In short, in the aftermath of the latest crisis, public bailouts of private 
firms are widely viewed as a deeply flawed method of market-preserving. 
Unfortunately, they also appear to be inevitable, at least in the financial 
services sector in which explicitly publicly-backed banks occupy the 
center stage.211 Despite policy-makers’ public assurances to the contrary, 
there is hardly any doubt that the current regulatory framework will not 
prevent the next systemic crisis and that, when that crisis happens, many 
banks—and numerous other financial institutions inextricably connected 
to banks—will likely be bailed out.212  
Banks are special in that they perform important public functions—
such as providing transactional accounts, operating payments system, and 
serving as channels for transmission of monetary policy—and are 
inherently vulnerable to creditor runs.213 But banks are also very “special” 
entities in a deeper, constitutive sense: though organized as privately-
owned corporations, banks are quintessential public-private 
partnerships.214 Unlike regular business corporations, US banks receive an 
expressly conditioned governmental grant of authority to conduct only the 
legislatively defined business of banking.215 In effect, the government 
authorizes banks to perform vital public functions—creation of money and 
allocation of credit—for private gain.216 Thus, banking is not a purely 
private economic enterprise: it is also a delegated public-policy 
responsibility.217 
 
 
(2011); J.W. Verret, Treasury Inc.: How the Bailout Reshapes Corporate Theory and Practice, 27 
YALE J. ON REG. 283 (2010). For a more taxpayer-oriented approach, see generally Black, supra note 
207; Cheryl D. Block, Measuring the True Cost of Government Bailout, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 149 
(2010); Manns, supra note 201. 
 211. See Adam J. Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts, 99 GEO. L.J. 435 (2011) (arguing that it is 
impossible to eliminate the possibility of bailing out financial institutions posing systemic risk). 
 212. See id. at 483–84. 
 213. For a classic articulation of this argument, see FED. RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS, 
ANNUAL REPORT 1982: ARE BANKS SPECIAL? (1982). 
 214. Political scientist David Ciepley makes a broader argument that all modern business 
corporations are properly understood as hybrid, public-private entities that are fundamentally 
constituted by the governments chartering them. David Ciepley, Beyond Public and Private: Toward a 
Political Theory of the Corporation, 107 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 139 (2013). We find this argument very 
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 215. See 12 U.S.C. § 24 (2014) (setting forth statutory limits on the “business of banking”). 
 216. See Morgan Ricks, Money and (Shadow) Banking: A Thought Experiment, 31 REV. BANKING 
& FIN. L. 731 (2012) (explaining the role of banks in money creation). 
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The government subjects banks to relatively intrusive regulation and 
supervision and retains the right to revoke any bank’s charter for failure to 
comply with its rules.218 The federal government also explicitly guarantees 
privately-owned banks’ debt to their depositors and commits to support 
banks experiencing temporary liquidity problems.219 This explicit public 
guarantee inevitably “leaks” to their non-bank affiliates and trading 
counterparties, so that all of the major financial intermediaries in today’s 
interconnected marketplace effectively enjoy an implicit public subsidy.220 
This subsidy is very difficult to measure and price in any individual case, 
partly because it is so widespread and deeply embedded in complex 
financial inter-linkages that it becomes almost invisible.221 But it is not 
difficult to see that, in the final analysis, the government—as a 
representative of the taxpaying public—stands behind private financial 
firms’ balance sheets. In fact, an individual banking institution’s entire 
balance sheet can be viewed as a “thick bundle of contingent claims on the 
government.”222  
This insufficiently appreciated but fundamental fact creates a puzzling 
inconsistency in our commonly accepted view of the business world. 
Corporate law generally identifies stockholders’ equity with residual risk-
bearing and accepts the intuitively just principle of reserving voting and 
management rights in a particular enterprise to the shareholders most 
exposed to the risk of its failure. The intuition behind this principle is that 
shareholders should be able to take preventative measures lowering their 
risk of loss. However, when it comes to banks, it is the government—the 
public—that ultimately bears the most residual risk of bank failure. Yet, 
 
 
 218. See 12 U.S.C. § 93 (2014) (containing provisions governing termination of the rights and 
privileges of a national bank that commits certain violations of the National Bank Act). 
 219. See, e.g., RICHARD S. CARNELL ET AL., THE LAW OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 60–63 (5th ed. 
2013) (briefly describing the role of the Federal Reserve as the lender of last resort and the FDIC’s role 
as the insurer of bank deposits). 
 220. For a discussion of certain legal aspects of this phenomenon, see Saule T. Omarova, From 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley to Dodd-Frank: The Unfulfilled Promise of Section 23A of the Federal Reserve 
Act, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1683 (2011). 
 221. For one recent estimate of this implicit subsidy, see VIRAL V. ACHARYA ET AL., THE END OF 
MARKET DISCIPLINE? INVESTOR EXPECTATIONS OF IMPLICIT GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES (2014), 
available at http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~sternfin/vacharya/public_html/pdfs/endofmarketdiscipline 
06242014.pdf.  
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Like the public-policy functions, government commitments permeate the bank balance sheet. 
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notwithstanding this most basic determinant of ownership and control 
rights, the government does not have any such rights in privately-owned 
financial institutions. Perhaps, this is so because the risk is presumed to be 
too remote, or because there is no specific number on the bank’s balance 
sheet showing the exact amount of the public subsidy, or because the 
taxpaying public is presumed to be sufficiently protected through 
government regulation. In light of our post-crisis wisdom, however, these 
assumptions do not appear credible. The American public is inevitably and 
continuously exposed to risks generated by publicly-subsidized, privately-
owned financial institutions: simply because it is difficult to put a single 
number on the amount of such subsidy or such risk does not mean they are 
not real.  
From that perspective, a conceptually coherent way to prevent the 
pernicious combination of socialized losses and privatized gains in the 
financial sector would be to restore the natural connection between risk 
and control. Since it is unrealistic to expect private financial firms to 
internalize the systemic risks they pose, the logical solution is to formalize 
the public’s residual risk-bearing role by granting it direct control rights in 
such firms.  
Recognizing the public’s de facto equity-like stake on financial firms’ 
balance sheets can open up new possibilities for systemic crisis 
prevention. Instead of debating how to structure better bailouts, we can 
start imagining how the government can use its internal firm-management 
rights to prevent bailouts. In essence, this approach would reinvent the 
government as a “manager of last resort” whose goal is to avoid having to 
perform all other “last-resort” roles. This shift in the posture of the 
government—from an external source of command-and-control to an 
internal stakeholder—can potentially lead to greater internalization by 
private firms’ owners, directors, and managers of a more explicitly public 
perspective in decision-making. This may be a difficult and gradual 
process but, if successful, it could serve as an effective ex ante alternative 
to bailouts and other ex post market-preserving measures. 
2. Traditional “Golden Share” Model 
The mechanism of a “special” or “golden” share in a private firm held 
by the government is a potentially promising precedent for 
operationalizing this new market-preserving, stability-enhancing 
technique. There is no single, legally precise definition of the golden share 
as a type of financial instrument. The term denotes a wide range of legal 
arrangements granting the government special, exclusive and non-
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transferable, governance rights in privately-owned enterprises.223 Golden 
shares gained popularity during the worldwide wave of privatizations of 
state-owned companies in the 1980s. Thus, when Margaret Thatcher’s 
conservative government privatized large and economically significant 
British enterprises—including Britoil, Aerospace, British Telecom, and 
Jaguar—it retained a special “golden share” in each of these newly private 
companies, which allowed the government to out-vote other 
shareholders.224 The governments of France, Turkey, Israel, and numerous 
post-communist countries in Eastern and Central Europe followed the 
British example by reserving a variety of special corporate governance and 
super-voting rights in privatized firms.225  
Typically, this mechanism was used to ensure continuing national, as 
opposed to foreign, control over privatized companies deemed to be 
strategically important.226 Governments also retained golden shares in 
enterprises in order to avoid or minimize the post-privatization social 
dislocation or political unrest.227 The golden share was a flexible 
mechanism that could be adjusted to fit particular circumstances, often on 
a company-by-company basis.228 The golden share gave the government 
disproportionate voting power with respect to the election of the 
company’s directors and various strategic decisions affecting the operation 
of the company (e.g., decisions to merge, dispose of material assets, or 
 
 
 223. According to one definition: 
Golden shares can be defined as a power to veto certain changes in the corporate charter. 
More specifically, the term refers either to a particular class of stock or a regulatory system 
that gives the state a continuing power over certain fundamental corporate decisions 
especially with respect to formerly state owned enterprises that have been privatized.  
Larry Catá Backer, The Private Law of Public Law: Public Authorities as Shareholders, Golden 
Shares, Sovereign Wealth Funds, and the Public Law Element in Private Choice of Law, 82 TUL. L. 
REV. 1801, 1806 n.12 (2008). 
 224. See Andrei A. Baev, Is There a Niche for the State in Corporate Governance? Securitization 
of State-Owned Enterprises and New Forms of State Ownership, 18 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 1, 20 (1995); 
Alice Pezard, The Golden Share of Privatized Companies, 21 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 85, 85 (1995). 
 225. See Baev, supra note 224, at 21–22 (describing the use of “golden shares” in various 
countries). 
 226. See Pezard, supra note 224, at 86–87. The “national interest” in these cases typically covered 
activities linked to national security (defense industry), economic protection (energy supplies), and 
transportation and infrastructure (airlines, railroads, etc.). Id. In most European countries, the golden 
share allowed the government to block foreign acquisitions of corporate control in nationally important 
companies. Id.  
 227. See Baev, supra note 224, at 36–38 (describing the “politically sensitive” rationale). 
 228. See Stefan Grundmann & Florian Möslein, Golden Shares: State Control in Privatised 
Companies: Comparative Law, European Law and Policy Aspects, 2001 EUR. BANKING & FIN. L.J. 
623.  
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enter or discontinue a particular line of business).229 According to one 
commentator: 
Applying this technique, governments can effectively monitor 
privatized enterprises without retaining a controlling equity stake in 
them. Contrary to conventional shares, the golden share provides 
governments with the power to monitor the ordinary commercial 
activity of a corporation in addition to the standard power of 
corporate governance.230 
The government’s ability to affect directly a private firm’s substantive 
business decisions—while not necessarily holding a majority (or even any) 
economic equity stake—is a particularly promising feature of the golden 
share as a potential model for designing a new mechanism for preventing 
systemic financial crises. The latest financial crisis demonstrated the 
danger of relying on private financial institutions’ internal risk 
management and individually rational decision-making to ensure systemic 
stability. Formal regulatory oversight of financial institutions’ activities, at 
least in its current form, also has significant limitations, especially given 
the pervasiveness of regulatory arbitrage and the increasing complexity 
and opacity of financial products and transactions.231 As market 
“outsiders,” financial regulators perennially lag behind private market 
participants in their ability to access and process vital market information, 
and their ability to act is inherently limited by various jurisdictional 
constraints.232  
By contrast, giving the government a direct equity stake with special 
management rights in financial-service firms—that is, making the 
government a firm insider—would remove many of these legal and 
informational obstacles. As a special shareholder with uniquely tailored 
rights, the government would acquire the new capacity to take speedy and 
effective action necessary to counteract socially harmful and thus 
irrational effects of pure market rationality. In that sense, this arrangement 
would operate as an explicitly proactive and preventative form of the 
government’s traditional market-preserving role. 
 
 
 229. See Baev, supra note 224, at 23–27 (enumerating key characteristics of the golden share). 
 230. Id. at 27. 
 231. For a discussion of the role complexity plays in reducing the efficacy of the current 
regulatory regime, see Saule T. Omarova, License To Deal: Mandatory Approval of Complex 
Financial Products, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 63, 68–78 (2012).  
 232. See Saule T. Omarova, Wall Street as Community of Fate: Toward Financial Industry Self-
Regulation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 411, 431–38 (2011). 
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To many, the very idea of making the federal government a direct 
equity owner in private financial firms may appear too radical, 
unworkable, or even dangerous. As is true for any novel proposal, it raises 
potentially difficult questions of legal doctrine, administrative design, and 
economic practicality. This Article does not seek to offer answers to all of 
those questions. Our more modest goal is to sketch out a broad outline for 
re-purposing the golden share as a new tool of ensuring systemic financial 
stability and minimizing the likelihood of financial crises. How might this 
new mechanism work? 
3. SGS Mechanism: Outline of the Proposal 
The creation of the golden share mechanism would require an act of 
Congress. The main operative provision of the enabling statute would 
mandate issuance by each “Covered Entity” of a single share of a special 
class—“State Golden Share” or “Special Government Share” (“SGS”)—to 
be beneficially and legally owned, exclusively and at all times, by the 
federal government in its capacity as the “SGS Holder.”  
The definition of “Covered Entity” could include all financial 
institutions, by referencing either their regulatory status (broker-dealers, 
FDIC-insured depository institutions, etc.) or the predominantly financial 
nature of their business activities.233 Alternatively, Congress may limit the 
definition to systemically important financial institutions (“SIFIs”).234 This 
approach would allow the government to concentrate its efforts only on 
the firms determined to pose risks to systemic stability, but its practical 
efficacy depends on the accuracy of that notoriously difficult judgment.235 
With respect to financial conglomerates, it is critical that the government 
hold the golden share in the top-level holding company, where all strategic 
group-wide decisions are typically made and all group-wide data are 
 
 
 233. There are numerous legal formulations of the nature-of-activities requirement 
(“substantially” financial, “predominantly” financial, etc.) and the criteria for determining whether a 
firm meets it. Typically, the rules focus on the composition of the company’s total consolidated assets, 
revenues, and/or income. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 5311(a) (2014).  
 234. The statute could incorporate by reference a particular definition of SIFI under existing 
regulations. See Financial Stability Oversight Council, 77 Fed. Reg. 21,637 (Apr. 11, 2012) (to be 
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1310).  
 235. Under the Dodd-Frank Act, the newly created Financial Stability Oversight Committee 
(“FSOC”) is charged with determining whether a particular non-banking financial company is 
systemically important enough to be regulated by the Federal Reserve. To date, the FSOC has made 
only a few such official determinations, some of which have been challenged by the affected 
companies. See, e.g., Warren S. Hersch, MetLife Objects to SIFI Designation by FSOC, 
LIFEHEALTHPRO (Dec. 18, 2014), http://www.lifehealthpro.com/2014/12/18/metlife-objects-to-sifi-
designation-by-fsoc.  
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aggregated and assessed. To avoid unnecessary duplication, it may make 
sense not to hold golden shares in subsidiaries of the same holding 
company.236 
Because SGS is a federally-created instrument, its terms do not have to 
comply with the requirements of state corporate laws, and its holder’s 
rights and obligations can be vastly different from those of a regular 
corporate shareholder. The greatest challenge in designing SGS is to find a 
proper balance of public and private interests within the context of a 
functioning economic enterprise. In principle, we envision the SGS as a 
dynamic mechanism, a sliding scale of management rights triggered by 
specified events. The SGS should be viewed as a form of conditional 
rather than absolute, temporary rather than permanent, and calibrated 
rather than uniformly predetermined government control over the Covered 
Entity’s internal governance. 
Unlike conventional shareholders, the SGS Holder would not have to 
make a capital contribution in exchange for its golden share and, 
generally, would not receive any dividends or distributions.237 Unless and 
until one or more of the specified triggering events happen, the SGS is 
meant to remain largely a passive instrument. In this period of dormancy, 
the SGS Holder would not be expected or entitled to exercise any direct 
management rights in the firm. Its rights would be primarily of an 
informational and representational nature. It is crucial, however, that the 
SGS Holder have a broad right of direct and timely access to the firm’s 
internal information.238 Private firms’ right to preserve, within reasonable 
limits, confidentiality of their business information would have to be 
 
 
 236. This approach may also be preferable as a scope-limiting device because it is based on the 
organizational criteria rather than the qualitatively complex SIFI determination. Under this approach 
the statute would have to preclude entity arbitrage designed to shift strategic information-gathering and 
decision-making functions into corporate layers below the top parent-company. 
 237. The SGS can have nominal value of $1.00, at which it would be carried on the Covered 
Entity’s balance sheet. This nominally-valued instrument would not entitle the government to any 
economic rights of a conventional shareholder, such as the right to receive dividends or distributions. 
This important feature distinguishes the proposed SGS mechanism from the more familiar instances of 
government acquiring control through purchase of a majority equity stake in a firm. Structuring the 
SGS as primarily (if not exclusively) a control instrument underscores its quasi-regulatory nature and 
highlights the government’s role as a collective actor seeking to resolve certain market dysfunctions, 
as opposed to seeking pecuniary gains. However, if the government later deems it necessary to 
contribute capital to a Covered Entity, it should receive statutorily specified economic rights.  
 238. Financial institutions zealously guard their “proprietary” information, partly because they 
fear that competitors would copy or otherwise thwart their trading or investment strategies, and partly 
because opacity and complexity of their “branded” financial products effectively allow these 
institutions to extract monopoly rents. For an explanation of this phenomenon of “strategic 
complexity,” see Dan Awrey, Complexity, Innovation, and the Regulation of Modern Financial 
Markets, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 235, 262–67 (2012); Omarova, supra note 231, at 68–75. 
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balanced against the government’s right to know what it needs to know to 
protect the public from financial harm.239  
To take full advantage of its informational rights, the SGS Holder must 
have permanent representation on the Covered Entity’s board of directors. 
The enabling statute will need to delineate the rights and duties of special 
SGS-appointed directors (“SGS Directors”), in line with the overarching 
objectives of the SGS regime.240 SGS Directors are not the same as 
independent directors, with their presumed neutrality and objectivity, 
primarily inferred from their lack of direct financial interest in the firm. 
They are representatives (and employees) of the US government, and their 
primary fiduciary duties should run to the taxpaying American public. If 
necessary, SGS Directors would have a right to request additional 
information from the firm’s management or agents.241 It may also be 
desirable to grant SGS Directors certain “baseline” special voting rights 
that remain in effect at all times, even when the SGS is otherwise 
“dormant.” In parallel to the traditional golden share mechanism,242 SGS 
Directors’ approval may be required for certain important corporate 
decisions—although the emphasis here should be primarily on matters 
related to systemic financial stability.243  
Generally, SGS Directors would function as our collective eyes and 
ears on financial institutions’ boards, the embodiment of the government-
as-market-actor striving to correct private markets’ potentially 
destabilizing and socially destructive “natural” tendencies.244 It is 
reasonable to expect that their watchful presence and explicitly systemic 
perspective would significantly improve boardroom dynamics and alter 
 
 
 239. The private firms’ interest, while subordinated in principle to the public interest, can be 
reasonably protected through carefully designed procedural mechanisms limiting the SGS Holder’s 
ability to use or disclose particularly sensitive trade information to other market participants. 
 240. How many SGS Directors should be appointed in any particular case would depend on the 
individual profile, size, and other relevant circumstances of each Covered Entity. The idea here is to 
have a special class of directors with special class-specific rights that, under certain circumstances, 
may override purely numeric voting outcomes.  
 241. The statute should expressly prohibit Covered Entities from taking any action whose 
intended or unintended effect would be to limit SGS Directors’ access to information or participation 
in decision-making processes. 
 242. See sources cited supra notes 223–27 and accompanying text. 
 243. The SGS Directors’ approval could be required whenever the Covered Entity’s board of 
directors approves the management’s strategic business plan for the company, adoption of an 
executive compensation program, or appointment of external auditors. The government entity acting as 
SGS Holder will determine which matters are significant enough to require SGS Directors’ review and 
pre-approval, based on a particular firm’s business/risk profile, systemic footprint, and any other 
relevant considerations.  
 244. See supra notes 103–10 and accompanying text.  
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the balance of power between financial firms’ boards of directors and 
managers.  
The occurrence of specified events would trigger additional special 
rights of SGS Holder. Statutory triggering events would effectively 
activate the SGS Holder’s direct management rights, shifting the entire 
mechanism from its relatively passive “peacetime” state into the actively 
participatory high-alert phase. Devising a precise hierarchy of statutory 
triggers and corresponding SGS rights is a challenging and intensely 
technical exercise that goes beyond the scope of this Article. Nevertheless, 
it is helpful to outline some of the potentially relevant considerations. 
In principle, the choice of SGS triggers should be tied to the main 
policy objective of the new regime: preserving systemic financial stability 
and preventing excessive accumulations of risk in the financial sector. 
Special SGS rights should be activated in response to certain internal and 
external signals indicating potentially greater likelihood of increasing 
systemic risk or instability. Some of the familiar regulatory and 
supervisory metrics—capital adequacy levels, supervisory ratings, or 
stress test results—can easily double as proxies for triggering additional 
SGS rights. Serious problems with a Covered Entity’s legal and regulatory 
compliance, financial reporting, or internal risk management should also 
serve as triggers for escalating the SGS Holder’s level of managerial 
control.245 Perhaps of even greater importance are signs of emerging trends 
in a particular Covered Entity’s business strategy and overall risk appetite. 
For example, special SGS rights can be triggered by a potentially 
problematic shift in a Covered Entity’s business and risk profile, as a 
result of either acquisition-driven growth or an internally-driven change in 
the composition or nature of its assets and liabilities.246  
 
 
 245. The trigger may be an obvious case of legal misconduct or regulatory violation, such as 
participation in a price-rigging scheme or fraudulent accounting practices. Examples include recent 
scandals involving analyst research conflicts of interest, LIBOR and foreign exchange rates 
manipulation, or “robo-signing” and other illegal home loan foreclosure practices of large US banks. A 
particular firm implicated in, or subject to investigation in connection with, any such scandal would 
risk immediate triggering of additional SGS management rights. The SGS rights may also be triggered 
in response to a series of less egregious violations indicating a troublesome pattern of the 
management’s failure to ensure compliance with laws and regulations.  
 246. Potential tell-tale signs may include rapid growth of particular asset categories in a Covered 
Entity’s or its key subsidiaries’ portfolios (e.g., certain types of ABS), a discernible increase in the 
volume or riskiness of certain types of off-balance-sheet transactions (e.g., credit default swaps), or 
rising levels or changing tenor of the company’s or its key subsidiaries’ liabilities (e.g., increased 
reliance on borrowing in wholesale securities repurchase markets). 
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Size-related metrics may be particularly useful as potential triggers.247 
Any absolute quantitative size trigger should be set at the level that would 
pick up all financial institutions that are potentially “too big to fail” 
(“TBTF”). This threat of potentially intrusive governmental “meddling” in 
large firms’ internal business affairs may operate as a significant deterrent 
against becoming TBTF. 
Enhanced SGS rights might also be triggered simultaneously across all 
Covered Entities (or their relevant subset) by sudden accelerations in 
credit growth across the financial system, which may indicate excessive 
build-up of risk and leverage feeding a speculative asset bubble. The 
government could arrest this potentially destabilizing systemic trend by 
exercising its special SGS rights to veto or slow down certain kinds of 
lending (or borrowing) activities pursued by individual firms. Building 
external triggers into the SGS mechanism would enhance its utility as a 
complement to the government’s regulatory efforts.248  
Defining and applying SGS triggers is a challenging and context-
specific exercise that requires an individualized assessment of all relevant 
factors. It is, therefore, critical to allow the SGS Holder a significant 
degree of discretion in deciding when exactly its special rights should be 
triggered, and how exactly they should be used. To ensure accountability, 
the enabling statute will need to provide both a clear normative basis for 
the exercise of discretion249 and a robust procedural framework for making 
entity-specific SGS trigger determinations.250  
In the post-trigger mode, the government would essentially assume its 
(temporary) role as the manager of last resort. In this role, the SGS Holder 
would have broad veto powers allowing it to block any decision by a 
 
 
 247. Under current regulations, financial institutions with more than $50 billion in total 
consolidated assets are generally presumed to be systemically important. Non-banking financial 
companies that meet this size threshold are further evaluated for systemic significance based on a mix 
of quantitative and qualitative criteria. See, e.g., Financial Stability Oversight Council, 77 Fed. Reg. at 
21,659. 
 248. Thus, SGS Holder’s demand that individual firms raise more equity as a condition to 
continuing their lending activities would function as an internal-governance complement to regulatory 
“dynamic provisioning” and counter-cyclical capital buffer requirements. 
 249. Because correct and timely recognition and interpretation of market signals is inherently 
difficult, it is important to introduce an explicitly precautionary principle into this exercise. For a 
discussion of the role of precautionary principle in financial services regulation, see Hilary J. Allen, A 
New Philosophy for Financial Stability Regulation, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 173 (2013).  
 250. Generally, accountability-enhancing procedural rules are a well-established and familiar 
element of regulatory design. In devising such rules for the SGS regime, one may be able to draw on a 
variety of existing examples.  
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Covered Entity’s board or shareholders.251 It would have the right to call 
shareholder meetings with specific agenda.252 In practice, the SGS Holder 
would likely act through the firm’s serving SGS Director(s), transforming 
their role from that of passive monitors to that of active decision-makers. 
In effect, SGS Directors would take control of the board’s actions.253 
Generally, they would have a right to impose temporary moratoria on 
shareholder distributions and major corporate transactions; to suspend or 
remove any manager or officer of the firm; to call special board meetings 
with specific agenda; and to propose specific resolutions for the board’s 
vote.254 For instance, SGS Directors could propose board resolutions 
halting specific high-risk trading or investment activities, reducing the 
firm’s risk exposure by selling certain assets or unwinding trading 
positions, revising internal policies and procedures governing activities in 
question, raising more equity and reducing the firm’s leverage, and 
suspending or replacing individual managers or executive officers. If these 
measures prove insufficient to resolve and prevent likely recurrence of the 
firm’s problems, SGS Directors could propose to the board a resolution 
mandating sale of certain subsidiaries or segments of the firm’s business—
a measure that could effectively break up a TBTF entity. If, on the other 
hand, the less drastic corrective measures work, so that the degree of 
systemic risk posed by the Covered Entity’s activities is reduced below the 
statutory trigger level, the SGS would revert to its dormant state and SGS 
Directors would relinquish their special rights, in accordance with the 
procedure specified in the statute. 
While it is possible to vest the SGS Holder responsibilities in one of 
the existing financial regulators, such as the Federal Reserve or FDIC, it is 
preferable to establish either a new federal agency or a federally-chartered 
 
 
 251. Of course, the government should not exercise its broad veto rights indiscriminately. The 
idea is simply to give the government the necessary flexibility to take whatever measures are called for 
under the circumstances.  
 252. It may be desirable to grant the SGS Holder super-majority voting power, but only with 
respect to matters that are expressly determined by the SGS Holder to be critically important for the 
preservation of the long-term stability of the US financial system. The statute would have to establish 
procedural rules that the SGS Holder, or any of its agents, must follow in making the required 
determination of “critical importance.” 
 253. The extent, nature, and specific mechanisms of such control would depend on the nature and 
severity of the SGS-triggering concerns and other relevant circumstances. 
 254. Again, it may be desirable to grant SGS Directors super-majority voting power with respect 
to matters expressly determined to be critically important for the preservation of the long-term stability 
of the US financial system, as provided in the enabling statute. See sources cited supra note 249 and 
accompanying text. 
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government corporation to act as the SGS Holder.255 It may be desirable to 
combine the functions of the SGS Holder and those of the NCMC, 
discussed earlier, in a single government entity.256 If designed properly, 
this new combined entity can effectively become the institutional 
embodiment of the modern developmental finance state.257 That, however, 
is the next stage in our model-building process.258 Generally, institutional 
design choices—i.e., deciding which specific government actor should 
perform the proposed functions, how it should be organized and governed, 
and how it should interact with other public and private entities—are 
critically important elements of our vision of a developmental finance 
state. They are also sufficiently complex to deserve a separate, more 
nuanced treatment. 
At this stage, our goal was to sketch out some of the principal elements 
of an SGS mechanism that builds on, but goes beyond the limited confines 
of, Europe’s original “golden share” arrangements.259 Our proposal raises 
many questions and leaves many details to be filled in at a later point.260 It 
 
 
 255. The choice between a federal agency and a government corporation has significant 
consequences. The US federal government has a long history of chartering special government 
corporations, many of which operate under a unique set of privileges and constraints. See, e.g., Lebron 
v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 384–91 (1995) (describing the history of Amtrak and 
other government-chartered corporations). For an analysis of the functions and organizational 
structures of government corporations and quasi-governmental entities, see A. Michael Froomkin, 
Reinventing the Government Corporation, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 543; Anne J. O’Connell, Bureaucracy 
at the Boundary, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 841 (2014); Benjamin A. Templin, The Government Shareholder: 
Regulating Public Ownership of Private Enterprise, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 1127 (2010). 
 256. We briefly suggested setting up such an umbrella agency—a National Investment Authority, 
or NIA—when discussing the NCMC model. See supra note 197 and accompanying text. NCMC and 
the SGS Holder are fundamentally similar in their missions and their primary mode of action as 
endogenous financial market participants. NCMC’s investment operations could serve as the source of 
independent financing of the SGS Holder’s activities. NCMC’s focus on financing and guiding nation-
wide economic development and the SGS Holder’s focus on preserving financial and economic 
stability are complementary, which bodes well for the emergence of a shared institutional culture. 
 257. To be effective, this new entity would have to (1) have the necessary technical and financial-
management expertise, (2) be democratically accountable but sufficiently insulated from political 
pressure, and (3) be able to resist “capture” by private interests. For an insightful discussion of the 
many forms of regulatory capture and potential ways of minimizing its harmful effects, see James 
Kwak, Cultural Capture and the Financial Crisis, in PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL 
INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT 71 (Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss eds., 2014); 
Lawrence G. Baxter, “Capture” in Financial Regulation: Can We Channel It Toward the Common 
Good?, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 175 (2011); Lawrence G. Baxter, Understanding Regulatory 
Capture: An Academic Perspective From the United States, in THE MAKING OF GOOD FINANCIAL 
REGULATION 53 (Stefano Pagliari ed., 2012). 
 258. We plan to elaborate further on the proposed NIA structure in subsequent work. 
 259. See sources cited supra notes 223–30 and accompanying text. 
 260. An important set of issues that needs to be addressed in greater detail concerns the relative 
rights of private shareholders in Covered Entities vis-à-vis the SGS Holder. The federal government’s 
emergency equity investments under TARP raised difficult issues regarding the availability of judicial 
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may ultimately prove to be too difficult or politically toxic to implement in 
practice. Yet, it may also be more plausible than the critics are willing to 
acknowledge. At the very least, it suggests a new direction for the 
important debate on the complex relationship between public and private, 
states and markets, finance and development. 
CONCLUSION 
In this Article, we have sought to begin the much-needed process of 
deep rethinking of the federal government’s role in today’s financial 
markets. We have argued that, contrary to the dominant narrative, the 
government is not merely an exogenous force acting upon private financial 
markets in its traditional supervisory or constitutive capacity. The 
government is also an endogenous force acting within financial markets in 
a directly participatory capacity. Not only does it correct pervasive market 
failures and provide vital public goods, but it also creates, moves, 
amplifies, and preserves private markets in ways that enhance these 
markets’ potential to serve important long-term public interests—interests 
that do not always fit neatly under the orthodox categories of public goods 
provision and market failure.  
All too often, however, this proactive market-actor role of the 
government is taken for granted and invisible, so its transformative 
potential remains hidden and unappreciated as well. This Article has tried 
to shed some light both on the existing forms of the government-as-
market-actor modality and on potential ways to expand the government’s 
market-actor toolkit in pursuit of the more ambitious goal of continuous 
and stable long-term national development.  
Our proposals for expanding the range and increasing the intensity of 
the government-as-market-actor modality are unorthodox, ambitious, and 
bound to attract criticism. Some critics may, intentionally or 
unintentionally, misconstrue our concept of a developmental finance state 
as a direct attack on free market enterprise and advocacy of socialist 
central planning—both of which are commonly thought of as 
fundamentally un-American. Any such inference would be incorrect. The 
idea of a strong, visionary state mobilizing, augmenting, and channeling 
 
 
and administrative review of the government’s actions in its new capacity as a controlling shareholder. 
Many scholars emphasized the need to protect private shareholders against the government-
shareholder’s politically-driven actions that could negatively affect the corporation’s profitability. See 
sources cited supra notes 209–10. We recognize the significance of addressing these legal issues for 
the viability of the SGS regime and intend to do so in subsequent work. 
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private finance toward economic projects critical to the nation’s long-term 
development and growth is deeply rooted in US history. The country’s 
first Treasury Secretary, Alexander Hamilton, was the first modern 
statesman to devise a comprehensive developmental strategy for the 
American Republic. At the heart of Hamilton’s strategy was the creation 
of a strong public-private system of finance that would, on the one hand, 
underwrite federal monetary control and credit allocation and, on the other 
hand, aggregate and channel vital resources toward building American 
industry and trade. In essence, Hamilton’s vision was that of an emerging 
developmental finance state. In this Article, we seek to reclaim this 
uniquely American heritage.  
Other predictable criticisms might proceed along the familiar lines 
brilliantly identified by Albert Hirschman as the “perversity,” “futility,” 
and “jeopardy” theses:  
According to the perversity thesis, any purposive action to improve 
some feature of the political, social, or economic order only serves 
to exacerbate the condition one wishes to remedy. The futility thesis 
holds that attempts at social transformation will be unavailing, that 
they will simply fail to “make a dent.” Finally, the jeopardy thesis 
argues that the cost of the proposed change or reform is too high as 
it endangers some previous, precious accomplishment.261 
To the extent that these arguments, commonly encountered in the 
debate on financial sector regulation, represent self-interested or 
ideologically-driven reactions to progressive change, they rarely generate 
a productive intellectual exchange. This is not to say, however, that we 
consider our task completed. We are fully mindful that important further 
details must be elaborated, ambiguities resolved, and potential legal and 
administrative issues addressed before our broadly outlined vision could 
become more of a blueprint for action. We plan to continue that work. For 
now, a constructive debate on the pros and cons of what we have called 
here a developmental finance state would be a significant step toward a 
better understanding and appreciation of the role of public actors in private 
markets.  
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